Bad Judges
Geoffrey P. Miller1
In jurisdictions across the country, complaints are heard about judges and
magistrates who are incompetent, self-indulgent, abusive, or corrupt.2 These bad judges
terrorize courtrooms, impair the functioning of the legal system, and undermine public
confidence in the law. They should not be allowed in office. Yet many retain prestigious
positions even after their shortcomings are brought to light. The situation, moreover,
does not appear to be under control. If recent scandals in New York3 and other states4 are
a guide, incidents of judicial misconduct may be on the rise. 5
The problem of bad judges is embedded in broader considerations about the
optimal design of the judiciary in American political culture. The basic tradeoff is
between independence, accountability and quality. To preserve independenceit is
necessary to insulate judges from external controls over their behavior. If judges are
protected from external controls, however, they have fewer incentives to provide quality
services. To ensure accountability judges must be subject to democratic processes. But
influence and patronage, enemies of good judging, are inevitable when judges are chosen
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by political means. The challenge is to select, retain, supervise and remove judges in
such as way as to maintain independence and accountability while not unduly sacrificing
quality.6
The policy space is already populated with approaches to this challenge. Several
of these ideas make eminent sense. However, the common element of most is that they
rely on public processes.7 This paper explores a different reform, not inconsistent with
governmental responses, but based principally on the actions of private parties. The idea
has two parts. First, litigants would be presented with a randomly selected panel of trial
judges and permitted as of right to exclude one or more in such a way that the judges
being excluded are shielded from knowledge about the litigants’ choices.8 Second,
statistics on exclusion rates would be compiled and used to aid in the process of retention,
supervision and removal.
This paper is structured as follows. Part I describes activities that mark a jurist as
a bad judge. Part II addresses the fundamental policy tradeoff. Part III discusses existing
approaches to the problem. Part IV sets forth and analyzes the judicial exclusion
proposal.
I. Bad Judges: Types and Examples
Ideally, the mix of public policies employed to combat bad judges should take
account of the full range of activities thatimpair the quality of justice in America ’s
6
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courtrooms.9 It turns out that most examples of bad judging can be grouped into the
following categories: (1) corrupt influence on judicial action; (2) questionable fiduciary
appointments; (3) abuse ofoffice for personal gain; ( 4) incompetence and neglect of
duties; (5) overstepping of authority; (6) interpersonal abuse; (7) bias, prejudice and
insensitivity; (8) personal misconduct reflecting adversely on fitness for office; (9)
conflict of interest; (10) inappropriate behavior in a judicial capacity; (11) lack of candor;
and (12) electioneering and purchase of office.10
Corrupt Influence on Judicial Action. Most famously, bad judges corrupt the
administration of justice. They tip suspects about search warrants,11 hinder execution of
arrest warrants,12 block charges13 and reduce bail. 14 They overlook requirements for
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changes in legal status,15 fix parking tickets,16 dismiss moving violations,17 “take care” of
DUI cases,18 issue corrupt rulings in civil19 and criminal20 matters, and grant special
access privileges to lawyers with pending cases.21 If a matter is not before them, they
commandeer it,22 misappropriate the file,23 direct the case to a friendly judge24 or lobby
the judge to whom the matter is assigned.25 They even alter outcomes by tampering
with26 or fabricating27 official records.
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summarily dismissed criminal case against a friend).
21
See A Judge Judged: Jaffe’s Plea Shouldn’t Be The End of the Story, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette,
February 13, 2003, available at 2003 WL 3888717 (judge promised special access to attorneys in exchange
for bribe).
22
See, e.g., In re Joseph A. Condon, No. 77 CC-2, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at
http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge non-suited traffic tickets that were not assigned to him).
23
Carri Geer Thevenot, Judicial Commission: Complaint Resolved by Apology, Las Vegas ReviewJournal, February 24, 2002, available at 2002 WL 6871391 (judge kept the court file of his own child’s
case).
24
See Brian Anderson, Hyde Misconduct Hearing Ends, Contra Costa Times, March 28, 2003,
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http://www.cjp.ca.gov/PubReprovals/Schatz_PubR_121589.doc (judge intervened in son’s drug case); In re
Judge Glenda K. Doan, California Commission on Judicial Performance, August 13, 1990, available at
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See In the Matter of Edwards, 694 N.W.2d 701 (Indiana 1998) (judge presided over or attempted
to influence cases involving parties with whom judge was having sexual relations); Brendan Smith,
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See Inquiry Concerning Judge Michael E. Platt, California Commission on Judicial Performance,
No. 162, August 5, 2002, available at http://www.cjp.ca.gov/CN%20Removals/Platt%208-5-02.rtf (judge
fixed a ticket at the request of the wife of a man to whom the judge had owed money).
31
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Arthur S. Block, December 9, 2002, available at
http://cjp.ca.gov/CNCensureRTF/Block%20Decision%2012-09-02.rtf. (friend’s daughter).
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officials36 and colleagues.37 Judges also accept gratuities. Although gifts may not
themselves constitute bribery or extortion, they smack of impropriety when offered by
lawyers38 or litigants.39
Judges who corruptly influence outcomes frequently act as sole proprietors. But
malfeasance can become systematic. The FBI’s Operation Greylord investigation
revealed pervasive corruption in Cook County Illinois courts during the 1980s.40 Fifteen
judges and attorneys in the Youngstown Ohio area were convicted of federal crimes
between 1997 and 2000.41 A Washington Post exposé published in 2000 detailed
pervasive misconduct in the Hillsborough County Florida court system.42 Most recently,
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97 Wis.2d 485, 294 N.W.2d 485 (1980) (gifts from rental car company).
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See, e.g., Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899 (1997) (in petition for habeas corpus relief, party
convicted of capital murder held entitled to discovery into potential bias of Cook County trial judge who
had himself been convicted of taking bribes from criminal defendants); United States v. Maloney, 71 F.3d
645 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 927 (1996) (“yet another in an unfortunately long line of public
corruption cases which have left a blot on the escutcheon of Chicago justice”); Ian Ayres, The Twin Faces
of Judicial Corruption: Extortion and Bribery, 74 Denver University Law Review 1231 (1997) (describing
author’s confrontation with corrupt Cook County judge).
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See John Caniglia, Probe Drags Mahoning Courts to a New Low, Cleveland Plain Dealer, October
18, 2000, available at 2000 WL 5171084 (several defense attorneys, four municipal court judges, and a
former county prosecutor were convicted of various crimes ).
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available at 2000 WL 19623310. See also Ken Koehn, Courthouse Only Looks Silly, Insiders Maintain,
35
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widespread malfeasance has come to light in Brooklyn New York.43 One Brooklyn
justice was convicted of soliciting bribes and sentenced to prison;44 another was charged
with rigging a divorce.45 At least fourteen Brooklyn judges have recently faced ethical or
criminal investigations,46 and a district attorney is looking into still more allegations.47
Questionable Fiduciary Appointments. A particularlyrich source of benefits for
bad judges is the power to appoint friends and allies as criminal defense counsel,48 court
evaluators,49 guardians,50 receivers,51 trustees, mediators,52 referees,53 special counsel,54
or special masters. In Brooklyn New York, party leaders and politically connected law
Tampa Tribune, August 6, 2000, available at 2000 WL 24594017 (presenting insiders’ defense of the court
system).
43
See generally Alexandra Marks, In Brooklyn, Fixing a ‘Corrupt’ Court System ; Series of JudicialBribery Scandals May Lead to Changes in Way Judges Are Selected, Christian Science Monitor, August
12, 2003, available at 2003 WL 5254871 (describing Brooklyn scandal and analyzing its implications for
reform nationwide).
44
See Tom Perrotta, Trouble in Brooklyn Spurs Court Reforms: Oversight Added for Matrimonial
Matters, New York Law Journal, April 28, 2003 (Supreme Court Justice Victor I. Barron sentenced to
prison for soliciting bribes).
45
See Alexandra Marks, In Brooklyn, Fixing a ‘Corrupt’ Court System; Series of Judicial-Bribery
Scandals May Lead to Changes in Way Judges Are Selected, Christian Science Monitor, August 12, 2003,
available at 2003 WL 5254871 (indictment of Judge Garson).
46
Douglas Feiden, Trial and Error in Queens Courts, New York Daily News July 7, 2003, p.4.
47
Tom Hays, Corruption Scandal Shakes Brooklyn Court, Associated Press Online, August 4, 2003,
available at 2003 WL 60552348 (District Attorney reportedly conducting a grand jury investigation into the
relationships between Brooklyn judges, politicians and lawyers).
48
See In re Chrzanowski, 636 N.W.2d 758 (Michigan 2001) (judge appointed her paramour to
represent indigent criminal defendants at state expense without disclosing the relationship to opposing
counsel).
49
See Report of the Commission on Fiduciary Appointments (December 2001), available at
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/fiduciaryreport/fidcommreport.htm.
50
See John Council, E-mail Criticizes Judge’s Reprimand as “Unjustified” Texas Lawyer, February
11, 2002 (judge awarded an ad litem appointment in a child custody case to an attorney who had
represented the judge in a probate matter).
51
See Voting No on Elected Judges, New York Daily News, December 2, 2001, available at 2001
WL 27989053 (judge appointed the law partner of the county Democratic leader as receiver of a local
cemetery.)
52
In re Honorable Frances-Ann Fine, No. 9802-222, Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline,
October 1998, available at http://www.judicial.state.nv.us/finefindings98.htm (judge appointed her cousin
as mediator without disclosing the relationship, then threatened to hold the parties in contempt when the
mediator was not paid).
53
See Report of the Commission on Fiduciary Appointments (December 2001), available at
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/fiduciaryreport/fidcommreport.htm (mentioning referees as type of fiduciary
appointment subject to abuse).
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firms have received hundreds of such appointments.55 Brooklyn judges also reward
colleagues: one former judge received nearly 250 appointments while another collected
$424,000 for a guardianship conferred within three months of leaving office.56 Judges
also use appointments to reward their campaign managers, coordinators, treasurers, and
finance committee chairs.57
Abuse of Office for Personal Gain. Bad judges misuse their prestige58 and abuse
their contempt,59 warrant,60 bail,61 sentencing,62 and inherent63 powers. They do so in
order to avoid legal process,64 punish enemies,65 pursue political ambitions,66 conduct
54

Douglas Feiden, Trial and Error in Queens Courts, New York Daily News, July 7, 2003, at
(surrogate judge reportedly appointed a prominent Democrat to the lucrative position of counsel to the
public administrator; the appointee then made the Democratic country party boss a partner in his law firm.)
55
See Report of the Commission on Fiduciary Appointments (December 2001), available at
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/fiduciaryreport/fidcommreport.htm (providing details of investigation into
such appointments).
56
See Report of the Commission on Fiduciary Appointments (December 2001), available at
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/fiduciaryreport/fidcommreport.htm.
57
See Report of the Commission on Fiduciary Appointments (December 2001), available at
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/fiduciaryreport/fidcommreport.htm.
58
See, e.g., Inquiry Concerning Judge D. Ronald Hyde, California Commission on Judicial
Performance, May 14, 1996, available at http://cjp.ca.gov/CNCensureRTF/HydeCNCN_05-14-96.rtf
(complaint letters to airlines and book publisher on official letterhead); Public Admonishment of Judge
Charles W. Stoll, California Commission on Judicial Performance, June 3, 1996, available at
http://cjp.ca.gov/PubAdmRTF/StollPA_06-03-96.rtf (letters to collection agency on official letterhead).
59
See Inquiry Concerning O’Neal, 454 S.E.2d 780 (Georgia 1995) (improper use of contempt
power); Alaska Commission on Judicial Conduct, Formal Ethics Opinion # 002, available at
http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/CONDUCT.htm (judges who abuse the contempt power by jailing without basis
or explanation violate code of judicial conduct); Arkansas Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission,
Letter to Honorable Jack Lewis, Case No. 97-294, July 20, 1998, available at
http://www.state.ar.us/jddc/pdf/sanctions/Lewis97.294.PDF (judge inappropriately convicted a person of
contempt for posting materials on judge’s office door accusing the judge of misconduct).
60
See State Briefs, San Antonio Express-News, June 16, 2000, available at 2000 WL 27526998
(judge signed warrant for arrest of a personal enemy).
61
State Briefs, San Antonio Express-News, June 16, 2000, available at 2000 WL 27526998 (judge
set bail for wrongfully arrested attorney at $690,000).
62
See In re William D. Vanderwater, No. 76 CC-1, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at
http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge sentenced his own former tenant to jail in connection with a
personal dispute).
63
See, e.g., In re William G. Schwartz, No. 01 CC-3, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at
http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge improperly barred individuals from the courtroom); Miss.
High Court Orders Judge Reprimanded, Baton Rouge Advocate, October 12, 2001, available at 2001 WL
3872539 (judge who represented a husband in a divorce allegedly used his office to obtain a criminal
history of the ex-wife’s new husband).
64
See, e.g., In re Edwin A. Gausselin, No. 99 CC-1 Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at
http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge informed police that he was a member of the judiciary after
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business ventures67 and run personal errands.68 One Illinois judge managed to combine
many of these misdeeds in a few hours: he “detained a former tenant with the aid of a

being detained for driving under the influence); In re Cynthia Raccuglia, No. 99 CC-2 Illinois Judicial
Inquiry Board, available at http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (same); In re John M. Karns, Jr., No. 80
CC-4, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge destroyed
records of his DUI arrest, thus avoiding prosecution); Debbie Rhyne, Dooly Judge Punished for Striking
Deputy, Macon Telegraph, available at 2002 WL 23049756 (judge attempted to use his position to avoid a
citation for violating traffic laws); Adriana Colindres, Change Meant to Improve Courts Commission;
Amendment Asks Illinois Voters to Add Non-Judge Members to Panel, Peoria Journal Star, available at
1998 WL 5783398 (judge attempted to use his position to avoid citation for violating traffic laws); Linda
Kleindienst, Florida Court Orders Reprimand for Judge, Fort Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel, June 2, 2000,
available at 2000 WL 22176766 (judge attempted to use his position to avoid a citation for soliciting
prostitutes).
65
See, e.g., In re William G. Schwartz, No. 01 CC-3, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at
http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge allegedly pressured Southern Illinois University School of
Law to admit his stepson, and when the application was denied, retaliated by banning students from the
school’s clinic from representing clients in his court); Inquiry Concerning Gallagher, 951 P.2d 716
(Oregon 1998) (judge used official letterhead in numerous disputes with third parties); William Young,
Ousted Town Judge Can’t Practice for Three Years, New Jersey Lawyer, February 24, 2003 (judge
allegedly demanded that the school district fire a teacher who had gotten into an argument with the judge’s
son, and, when the district refused to comply, ordered the teacher arrested and presided over his
arraignment); Brendan Smith, Cases Cover a Wide Range, Albuquerque Journal, February 11, 2002,
available at 2002 WL 12685560 (magistrate ordered the arrest of a former tenant who had damaged the
floor of a building he owned, then set the bond so high that the tenant was forced to stay in jail until he
agreed to pay for the repairs).
66
See In re Peck, 867 P.2d 853 (Arizona 1994) (judge reinstated charges brought by two allies
against his electoral opponent); In re Hill, 8 S.W.3d 578 (Missouri 2000) (judge sat on the case of the
daughter of a political rival); In re Randall S. Quindry, No. 74-CC-1, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Commission,
available at http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge attempted to alter absentee ballots); Inquiry
Concerning O’Neal, 454 S.E.2d 780 (Georgia 1995) (judge ordered arrest of entire County Board of
Commissioners, which whom she was having a salary dispute); Inquiry Concerning Gallagher, 951 P.2d
716 (Oregon 1998) (judge used official stationary to solicit campaign contributions); Gary Sprott, Corporal
Wanted Transfer, Sheriff Says, Tampa Tribune, February 13, 2001, available at 2001 WL 5493834 (judge
forced staff to work on his re-election campaign); Gwen Filosa, Judge Asks for 1-year Penalty, New
Orleans Times-Picayune, June 14, 2003, available at 2003 WL 4014626 (judge directed his staff to sell
tickets to political fundraisers); Tiffany Y. Latta, Charges Pending Against Judge; Allegations Include
Sexual Harassment, Improper Solicitation of Campaign Funds, Columbus Dispatch, June 14, 2003,
available at 2003 WL 57336738 (judge hit up staff for campaign contributions); Judge Issues Regrets for
Re-election Remarks, Raleigh News & Observer, December 1, 2000, available at 2000 WL 29351535
(judge demanded campaign contributions from attorneys); Judicial Reform Needed Now, New Orleans
Times-Picayune, May 25, 2003, available at 2003 WL 4010966 (judge reportedly coerced his staff to work
on his reelection campaign).
67
See, e.g., Alaska Commission on Judicial Conduct, Formal Ethics Opinion # 012, available at .,
http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/CONDUCT.htm (use of official title and court system phone number to conduct
personal business); Public Admonishment of Judge Robert C. Coates, California Commission on Judicial
Performance, April 12, 2000, available at http://www.cjp.ca.gov/PubAdmRTF/CoatesPA_04-12-00.rtf
(judge used official title in applying for loans and seeking better service from merchants); Inquiry
Concerning Judge D. Ronald Hyde, California Commission on Judicial Performance, May 14, 1996,
available at http://cjp.ca.gov/CNCensureRTF/HydeCNCN_05-14-96.rtf (judge accessed DMV records to
compile private mailing list); Inquiry Concerning Judge James Randal Ross, California Commission on
Judicial Performance, April 30, 1998, available at http://cjp.ca.gov/CNCensureRTF/RossCNCN_04-3098.rtf (judge sold copies of his book at the courthouse and promoted it to jurors); In the Matter of the
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hand gun, had him arrested and charged with theft, procured a guilty plea and jury
waiver, conducted a midnight proceeding in the police station and sentenced [him] to 8
months in jail.”69
Bad judges also misappropriate public resources, dipping into the public till for
personal expenditures,70 falsifying expense records for travel, meals and lodging, 71
facilitating bogus reimbursement requests by staff,72 misusing the franking privilege,73
and requiring criminal defendants to contribute to their pet charities in lieu of fines.74
They also waste public funds for unnecessary expenditures such as boondoggles to
useless seminars.75

Honorable Gary J. Davis, Case No. 9502-107, Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline, December
1995, available at http://judicial.state.nv.us/davisfindings.htm (judge carried on an antiques business from
the courthouse).
68
See Inquiry Concerning Campbell, 426 S.E.2d 552 (Georgia 1993) (chauffeur and translation
services); In re Judge Judith Rogers, Arkansas Judicial Discipline & Disability Commission, March 22,
2000, available at http://www.state.ar.us/jddc/pdf/rogers.96.119.PDF (personal errands); Inquiry
Concerning Judge D. Ronald Hyde, California Commission on Judicial Performance, May 14, 1996,
available at http://cjp.ca.gov/CNCensureRTF/HydeCNCN_05-14-96.rtf (babysitting); In the Matter of the
Honorable Gary J. Davis, Case No. 9502-107, Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline, December
1995, available at http://judicial.state.nv.us/davisfindings.htm (chauffeur services).
69
In re William D. Vanderwater, No. 76 CC-1, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at
http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm.
70
See Inquiry Concerning Campbell, 426 S.E.2d 552 (Georgia 1993) (judge removed more than
$15,000 from the magistrate’s court); In the Matter of the Honorable Gary J. Davis, Case No. 9502-107,
Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline, December 1995, available at
http://judicial.state.nv.us/davisfindings.htm (judge took petty cash advances from court register); Two
Judges Face Censure for Judicial Misconduct, Salt Lake Tribune, January 7, 1999, available at 1999 WL
3340968 (judge stole bail money to cover personal debts); Brendan Smith, Espanola Group’s Deposits
Queried, Albuquerque Journal, September 27, 2003, available at 2002 WL 100703036 (judge allegedly
deposited $19,000 of public funds into account of nonprofit group he controlled).
71
Tracy Dash, Wes Teel Continued His Duties, Court Told, Biloxi Sun Herald, February 21, 2002,
available at 2002 WL 11385779 (judges resigned in order to avoid prosecution for falsifying expense
records).
72
See, e.g., In the Matter of the Honorable Raymond L. Kern, 774 N.E.2d 878 (Ind. 2002) (judge
submitted false mileage claims for employees who had already been paid).
73
See In re Samual G. Harrod, III, No. 80 CC-2, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at
http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge used official frank for self-promotional mailings).
74
See In the Matter of the Honorable Gary J. Davis, Case No. 9502-107, Nevada Commission on
Judicial Discipline, December 1995, available at http://judicial.state.nv.us/davisfindings.htm (judge
directed criminal defendants to contribute to designated charities in lieu of fines).
75
See In re Judge Pamela Taylor Johnson, 767 So.2d 2 (La. 2000) (refusing by 3-2 vote to
discipline judge for authorizing court employees to attend seminars unrelated to their job functions).
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Incompetence and Neglect of Duties. Bad judges may lack even slight command
of the law.76 They confuse elementary burdens of proof and persuasion,77 misunderstand
fundamental rights,78 rule prematurely,79 and generally display egregious ignorance of the
rules that supposedly govern their decisions. Bad judges procrastinate.80 Whether
because of emotional problems81 or laziness,82 they fail to rule on motions, set cases for
76

For an account claiming that incompetence is rampant in the New York State Supreme Court in
Queens, see Douglas Feiden, Trial and Error in Queens Courts, New York Daily News, July 7, 2003. p. 3.
77
See In re Euguene R. Ward, No. 73 CC-1, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at
http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge gave a judgment to a plaintiff who had presented no
evidence); Douglas Feiden, Trial and Error in Queens Courts, New York Daily News, July 7, 2003. p. 3
(judge forgot that the jury in a criminal case must find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt).
78
See In re Hathaway, 630 N.W.2d 850 (Mich. 2001) (judge threatened to imprison criminal
defendant if he did not waive jury trial); In the Matter of Honorable Douglas A. Cox, 680 N.E.2d 528 (Ind.
1997) (judge penalized a litigant for insisting on a jury trial); In the Matter of Vaughn, 462 S.E.2d 780
(Georgia 1995) (judge forced defendant to enter guilty plea without counsel present); Inquiry Concerning
Judge Howard R. Broadman, California Commission on Judicial Conduct, February 26, 1999, available at
http://www.cjp.ca.gov/PubAdmRTF/BroadmanPA_02-26-99.rtf (judge refused to allow a litigant to present
evidence, testify under oath, and cross-examine witnesses); Stuart Pfeifer, Ex-Doctor’s Sexual Battery
Conviction is Voided, Los Angeles Times, May 30, 2002, available at 2002 WL 2479320 (judge allowed
defendant to be questioned under oath in front of the jury without counsel present); John Sullivan, Durham
Judge’s Censure Sought, Raleigh News & Observer, January 12, 2000, available at 2000 WL 3909876
(judge convicted a defendant of a crime with which he had not been charged).
79
See In re Judge W.Q. Hall, Arkansas Judicial Discipline & Disability Commission, November 22,
1999, available at http://www.state.ar.us/jddc/pdf/sanctions/hall_98-284.pdf (judge entered judgment even
though neither party had appeared); In re Robert J. Sulski, No. 73-CC-4, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board,
available at http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge convicted a defendant before the defense
rested); Terry Dickson, Hammill Faces New Complaint, Florida Times-Union, October 19, 2001, available
at 2001 WL 25999931 (judge ordered party to pay money without a hearing).
80
See, e.g., In the Matter of the Complaint Against Van Susteren, 118 Wis.2d 806, 348 N.W.2d 579
(1984) (judge took eighteen years to resolve a probate matter); Doug Guthrie, Deal Allows Jelsema to
Retire, Avoid Discipline, Grand Rapids Press, February 11, 2003, available at 2003 WL 4846457 (judge
allowed a child support case to linger for more than a decade); In re Euguene R. Ward, No. 73 CC-1,
Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge entered judgment
for a plaintiff in a case that had been settled).
81
See, e.g., In the Matter of the Proceeding Pursuant to Section 44, subdivision 4, of the Judiciary
Law, in Relation to Robert N. Going, a Judge of the Family Court, Montgomery County, New York State
Commission on Judicial Conduct, December 29, 2000, available at
http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Determinations/G/going(2).htm (anxiety attacks); In the Matter of Carpenter,
17 P.3d 91 (Ariz. 2001) (narcolepsy); Richard Winton, Los Angeles Panel Fires Judge Who Resigned, Los
Angeles Times, May 11, 2001, available at 2001 WL 2486155 (phobia of the bench); Michael Rezendes,
Conduct Ruling Delayed So Judge Could Retire, Boston Globe, July 29, 2000, available at 2000 WL
3336538 (obsessive-compulsive disorder).
82
See Matter of The Proceeding Pursuant to Section 44, Subdivision 4, of The Judiciary Law, In
Relation To J. Kevin Mulroy, A Judge Of The County Court, Onondaga County, New York Law Journal,
August 23, 1999 (judge pressured a prosecutor to offer a plea because the judge wanted to get home for
“men’s night out”); Kennick v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 787 P.2d 591 (California 1990)
(judge quit showing up for court prior to his retirement); Doan v. Commission on Judicial Performance,
902 P.2d 272 (California 1995) (judge was habitually 60 to 90 minutes late in commencing court sessions);
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trial, or issue decisions.83 Poor administration can also be an issue. Bad judges lose
evidence,84 misplace files,85 mismanage staff,86 and fail to keep accounts of the court’s
financial registry.87 They neglect official responsibilities by delegating them to law
clerks,88 prosecutors,89 court clerks,90 and even law students91 and law professors!92

Brendan Smith, Some Judges Run Afoul of the Law, Albuquerque Journal, February 10, 2002, available at
2002 WL 12685479 (judge showed up in court only two days a month, would not post a schedule, and was
finally removed after failing to appear for four straight months).
83
See, e.g., In the Matter of Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against Dreyfus, 182 Wis.2d 121,
513 N.W.2d 604 (1994) (judge failed to decide cases in a timely manner); In re Hathaway, 630 N.W.2d
850 (Mich. 2001) (judge displayed an “overall lack of industry”); In re Honorable Thomas P. Breen,
California Commission on Judicial Performance, February 28, 1995, available at
http://www.cjp.ca.gov/PubReprovals/Breen_PubR_022895.doc (judge found to have engaged in a
continuing pattern of failing to dispose of judicial matters promptly and efficiently); In the Matter of
Honorable William McKimm, Arkansas Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission, No. 97-284,
available at http://www.state.ar.us/jddc/pdf/sanctions/mckimm_97-284_final.pdf (judge failed to handle
cases in timely fashion); Voting No on Elected Judges, New York Daily News, December 2, 2001,
available at 2001 WL 27989053 (study of justices and surrogates in state courts in New York City
concluded that “[n]early one in five missed more than two months of work, 48 failed to meet efficiency
targets, one in 10 failed to begin an adequate number of trials and one in 10 did not dispose of an adequate
number of cases”).
84
See Gwen Filosa, Money Sets Judicial Rivals Apart; Former Prosecutors Vie for Vacated Seat,
New Orleans Times-Picayune, October 29, 2002, available at 2002 WL 25262865 (trial judge removed
from office after failing to preserve at least a dozen trial transcripts).
85
See Wren Propp, Court Suspends Mora Magistrate, Albuquerque Journal, April 10, 2003,
available at 2003 WL 18623941 (county magistrate’s office lost paperwork and mishandled court files).
86
See In re Judge Sharon K. Hunter, 823 So.2d 325 (La. 2002) (judge failed to supervise court
reporters and other administrative personnel); In the Matter of the Complaint Against Van Susteren, 118
Wis.2d 806, 348 N.W.2d 579 (1984) (judge failed to supervise court personnel for prompt and efficient
disposition of official business).
87
See Boggan v. Judicial Inquiry Commission, 759 So.2d 550 (Alabama 1999) (judge found to have
presented fraudulent deposit slip to auditors of court registry accounts).
88
See Ann W. O’Neill, Appeals Court Criticizes L.A. Judge for ‘Egregious’ Misconduct, Los
Angeles Times, May 25, 2000, available at 2000 WL 2244483 (judge allowed his law clerk to preside over
a pre-trial conference).
89
See Fletcher v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 968 P.2d 958 (California 1998) (judge
delegated part of the sentencing function to prosecutor).
90
See In re Inquiry Concerning R.R. Seal, 585 So.2d 741 (Miss. 1991) (judge allowed clerical
personnel to adjudicate criminal cases); Mississippi Judicial Performance Commission v. Hopkins, 690
So.2d 857 (Miss. 1991) (judge allowed court clerks to dismiss parking tickets); In re Eugene R. Ward, No.
79 CC-1, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge
permitted court clerk to conduct court calls and enter orders).
91
See Janan Hanna, Outspoken Judge Will Take Class to Curb Anger, Chicago Tribune, May 9,
2002 (judge allowed visiting high school students to question an expert witness during a trial).
92
See In the Matter of Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against Tesmer, 219 Wis.2d 708, 580
N.W.2d 307 (1998) (judge allowed a law professor to draft judicial opinions).
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Overstepping Authority. Bad judges disregard of the limits of their authority.93
Acting as quasi-vigilantes,94 they engage in personal investigations of alleged
wrongdoing,95 summarily try defendants without allowing them to prepare a defense,96
sentence them to jailbefore conviction,97 force cases to trial for inappropriate reasons,98
become personally involved with litigants,99 order witnesses arrested,100 and engage in
improper ex parte contacts with parties101 and witnesses.102 Misuse of the contempt
power is common. Bad judges inappropriately hold people in contempt for offenses such

93

As the Supreme Court of Florida described one such judge, “Graham made what he perceived to
be a valiant effort at ridding Citrus County of . . . political favoritism and government corruption . . . . His
zealous pursuit of a pure society apparently clouded his ability to impartially adjudicate the matters before
him. His motives are acceptable, but his methods are not.” Inquiry Concerning Graham, 620 So.2d 1273
(Fla. 1993).
94
One judge chased a couple in his own car when he observed their vehicle being operated in a
reckless manner, then forced them to appear before him in an “unofficial” hearing in order to teach them a
lesson. True Tragedy: Judge’s Loss Should be Retold Accurately, Columbus Dispatch, September 21,
1999, available at 1999 WL 27421423.
95
See Cheryl Reid, Tollefson, Stolz Say They Offer Clear Choice, Tacoma News Tribune, October
12, 2000, available at 2000 WL 5339113 (judge launched his own investigation of a child custody case).
96
See In re Judge Preston Aucoin, 767 So.2d 30 (La. 2000) (judge censured for practice of ordering
“instanter trials” immediately after defendants pleaded not guilty at arraignment).
97
See Inquiry Concerning Fred L. Heene, Jr., October 13, 1999, California Commission on Judicial
Performance, available at http://cjp.ca.gov/CNCensureRTF/HeeneCNCN_10-13-99.rtf (judge summarily
jailed a defendant for failing to complete community service obligation).
98
See Douglas Feiden, Trial and Error in Queens Courts, New York Daily News July 7, 2003 (judge
pushed a case to trial because he “felt it was necessary for the therapy” of the victim to “tell her story” in
order to “reach closure”).
99
See Fletcher v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 968 P.2d 958 (California 1998) (judge
encouraged a defendant in a family law matter to attend a religious men’s fellowship meeting at the judge’s
house where the defendant’s personal problems became a focus for discussion);Arkansas Judicial
Discipline and Disability Commission, Press Release, November 24, 1998, available at
http://www.state.ar.us/jddc/pdf/mckimswin.pdf (judge drove a juvenile he had sentenced to a detention
center, and when the center refused to accept the boy, took him to a gambling casino).
100
See Inquiry Concerning Fred L. Heene, Jr., October 13, 1999, California Commission on Judicial
Performance, available at http://cjp.ca.gov/CNCensureRTF/HeeneCNCN_10-13-99.rtf (judge summarily
ordered arrest of complaining witness in a rape case after she admitted giving a false statement to the
police).
101
Fletcher v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 968 P.2d 958 (California 1998) (judge engaged
in persistent ex parte contacts with parties).
102
In re Honorable Frances-Ann Fine, No. 9802-222, Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline,
October 1998, available at http://www.judicial.state.nv.us/finefindings98.htm (family court judge
persistently spoke ex parte with therapists and family services personnel in attempts to resolve matters
pending before her).
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as whispering,103 napping,104 tardiness,105 truancy,106 sassiness,107 and wearing annoying
tee shirts.108 Judges find people in contempt of court in absentia109 or when court is not
in session.110 They deny people the opportunity to respond to citations for contempt,111
summarily ban people from their courtrooms,112 and intimidate people by threats of
contempt.113
Interpersonal Abuse at the Workplace. Bad judges abuse nearly everyone in their
professional environment: attorneys,114 law clerks,115 secretaries,116 court reporters,117

103

See Inquiry Concerning Judge William M. Ormsby, California Commission on Judicial
Performance, March 20, 1996, available at http://cjp.ca.gov/CNCensureRTF/OrmsbyCNCN_03-20-96.rtf.
(judge ordered summary arrest of spectators and parties for whispering in court).
104
See Inquiry Concerning Judge William M. Ormsby, California Commission on Judicial
Performance, March 20, 1996, available at http://cjp.ca.gov/CNCensureRTF/OrmsbyCNCN_03-20-96.rtf
(judge summarily ordered party into custody for appearing to fall asleep in court).
105
See Inquiry Concerning Fred L. Heene, Jr., October 13, 1999, California Commission on Judicial
Performance, available at http://cjp.ca.gov/CNCensureRTF/HeeneCNCN_10-13-99.rtf (judge summarily
declared juror in contempt for being late to court).
106
See, e.g., In the Matter of the Honorable Donald C. Johnson, 658 N.E.2d 589 (Ind. 1995) (judge
ordered arrest of attorney who did not appear in court, then held summary contempt hearing in presence of
attorney’s client with attorney dressed in prison garb).
107
See, e.g., In re Glynn J. Elliott, Jr., No. 89 CC-2, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at
http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge verbally abused a high school student who was a spectator at
a hearing, had him summarily handcuffed to a chair, berated him again, and again ordered him handcuffed).
108
See In re Dexter A. Knowlton, No. 78 CC-1, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at
http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge sanctioned spectator for wearing tee shirt saying “bitch bitch
bitch
” ).
109
See, e.g., Public Admonishment of Judge Lisa Guy-Schall, California Commission on Judicial
Performance, October 14, 1999, available at http://www.cjp.ca.gov/PubAdmRTF/Guy-SchallPA_10-1499.rtf (judge sentenced a party not present in court to five days in jail for contempt).
110
See Commission on Judicial Performance v. Chinn, 611 So.2d 849 (Miss. 1992) (judge held a
highway patrolman in contempt when court was not in session).
111
See, e.g., Public Admonishment of Judge Lisa Guy-Schall, California Commission on Judicial
Performance, October 14, 1999, available at http://www.cjp.ca.gov/PubAdmRTF/Guy-SchallPA_10-1499.rtf (judge failed to allow a party the opportunity to respond to citation for contempt).
112
In re Keith E. Campbell, No. 79 CC-2, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at
http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge expelled two reporters from the courtroom when one began
sketching a witness, then locked the doors to the courtroom for the remainder of the trial).
113
See, e.g., Inquiry Concerning Judge James Randal Ross, California Commission on Judicial
Performance, April 30, 1998, available at http://cjp.ca.gov/CNCensureRTF/RossCNCN_04-30-98.rtf
(without proper cause, judge declared “if he says one more word even under his breath in this courtroom I
will hold him in contempt of court and you will take him to the Orange County jail”).
114
See, e.g., In re Elliston, 789 S.W.2d 469 (Missouri 199) (sixteen attorneys testified to their
personal experiences with abusive judge); Inquiry Concerning Judge Bruce Van Voorhis, California
Commission on Judicial Performance, February 27, 2003, available at
http://cjp.ca.gov/CN%20Removals/Van%20Voorhis%202-27-03.rtf (judge denigrated an attorney’s
competence in open court and conducted mocking colloquy with the jury present); In the Matter of the
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clerical staff,118 litigants,119 fact witnesses,120 expert witnesses,121 jurors,122 law
professors,123 law students,124 spectators,125 reporters,126 and other judges.127 In the worst

Proceeding Pursuant to Section 44, subdivision 4, of the Judiciary Law in Relation to Ira J. Raab, New
York State Commission on Judicial Conduct, February 3, 2003, available at
http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Determinations/R/raab.htm (judge displayed persistent pattern of abuse towards
attorneys); Tom Bailey Jr., ‘New’ McCalla Debuts as Jocular, Lawyer-Friendly, Memphis Commercial
Appeal, September 17, 2002, available at 2002 WL 24948083 (describing abusive judge’s attempt at
rehabilitation); Judge’s Penalty is Appropriate, South Florida Sun-Sentinel, April 12, 2003, available at
2003 WL 16669207 (judge belittled attorneys who appeared before him, threw tantrums, and exhibited
intemperate and unreasonable behavior); Ralph Ranalli, Lopez Resigns, Denies Misdeeds; Says Accepting
Findings Goes Against Principles, Boston Globe, May 20, 2003, available at 2003 WL 3397208 (judge was
persistently rude, hasty, discourteous, sarcastic, and condescending towards prosecutors).
115
See In the Matter of the Proceeding Pursuant to Section 44, subdivision 4, of the Judiciary Law, in
Relation to Robert N. Going, a Judge of the Family Court, Montgomery County, New York State
Commission on Judicial Conduct, December 29, 2000, available at
http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Determinations/G/going(2).htm (judge became abusive towards law clerk after
termination of romantic relationship between them).
116
See, e.g., In the Matter of McClain, 662 N.E.2d 935 (Ind.1996) (judge sent vulgar letters to
secretary employed at the courthouse and enclosed a used condom); Voting No on Elected Judges, New
York Daily News, December 2, 2001, available at 2001 WL 27989053 (judge made offensive sexual
comments to his secretary).
117
See Timothy R. Brown, Increasing Number of Judges Being Judged in Miss. Courts, Baton Rouge
Advocate, January 3, 2002 (judge accused of beating his own court reporter).
118
See Transfer Puts Judge in Concord, Contra Costa Times, October 24, 2002, available at 2002 WL
100622730 (judge sanctioned for abusing staff); Scott Sandlin, Metro Judge’s Suspension Upheld,
Albuquerque Journal, December 19, 2001, available at 2001 WL 31469050 (judge charged with being
threatening and abusive to court staff); Miss. High Court Orders Judge Reprimanded, Baton Rouge
Advocate, October 12, 2001, available at 2001 WL 3872539 (judge accused of verbally abusing court
clerks and other county employees); Cheryl Reid, Tollefson, Stolz Say They Offer Clear Choice, Tacoma
News Tribune, October 12, 2000, available at 2000 WL 5339113 (judge chased court employees down a
hallway in a rage).
119
See, e.g., Robynn Tysver, Omaha Judge Reprimanded for Mistreating Defendants, Omaha WorldHerald, September 30, 2000, available at 2000 WL 4374792 (judge routinely yelled at and berated
defendants who appeared before him).
120
See In the Matter of Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against the Honorable Ralph
G. Gorenstein, 174 Wis.2d 861, 434 N.W.2d 603 (1989) (judge criticized witness for crying on the stand).
121
See In the Matter of Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against the Honorable Ralph
G.Gorenstein, 174 Wis.2d 861, 434 N.W.2d 603 (1989) (judge made denigrating remarks about facility
with which expert witnesses were associated); Ann W. O’Neill, Appeals Court Criticizes L.A. Judge for
‘Egregious’ Misconduct, Los Angeles Times, May 25, 2000, available at 2000 WL 2244483 (judge
engaged in demeaning questioning of expert witness).
122
Transfer Puts Judge in Concord, Contra Costa Times, October 24, 2002, available at 2002 WL
100622730 (judge found to have mistreated jurors).
123
See In re Alan R. Schwartz, 755 So.2d 110 (Fla. 2000) (judge made sarcastic remarks about law
professor who was appearing in court and denigrated textbook she had written).
124
See In re Alan R. Schwartz, 755 So.2d 110 (Fla. 2000) (judge threatened to sanction legal clinic
student and then walked out before she completed her argument).
125
Miss. Panel Seeks Ouster of Judge for Misconduct, Memphis Commercial Appeal, December 17,
1998, available at 1998 WL 21183913 (judge allegedly had spectator arrested for leaning sideways on a
bench, then ordered a body cavity search).
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cases, the animosity boils over into assaults.128 Judges are also accused of sexually
harassing a virtual census of courthouse workers: prosecutors,129 public defenders,130
probation officers,131 court reporters,132 caseworkers,133 bailiffs,134 administrative
clerks,135 interns,136 secretaries, 137 other employees,138 journalists,139 law clerks,140 and
even fellow judges.141

126

Miss. Panel Seeks Ouster of Judge for Misconduct, Memphis Commercial Appeal, December 17,
1998, available at 1998 WL 21183913 (judge ordered reporter arrested for publishing juvenile arrest
record).
127
See In the Matter of Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against the Honorable Robert Crawford,
629 N.W.2d 1 (Wisconsin 2001) (judge threatened to publicize purported evidence of misconduct by chief
judge); Inquiry Regarding Jose Angel Velasquez, California Commission on Judicial Performance, April
16, 1997, available at http://cjp.ca.gov/CNCensureRTF/VelasquezCNCN_04-16-97.rtf (judge made public
statements disparaging fellow judges); Joe Gyan Jr., Judge Receives 30-day Suspension, Baton Rouge
Advocate, November 29, 2001, available at 2001 WL 3876933 (judge cursed at two fellow judges); In re
Jones, 581 N.W.2d 876 (Neb. 1998) (judge said “fuck you” to fellow judge and called her a “bitch”).
128
See, e.g., Commission on Judicial Performance v. Guest, 717 So.2d 325 (Mississippi 1998)
(assault on a litigant); Joe Gyan Jr., Judge Receives 30-day Suspension, Baton Rouge Advocate, November
29, 2001, available at 2001 WL 3876933 (assault on judge).
129
See In re the Matter of Honorable Mark S. Deming, 736 P.2d 639 (Wash. 1987) (judge
commented on breasts of prosecuting attorney and told another prosecutor that he wanted to “jump your
bones”); Robert Becker, State Ousts Judge, Cites Harassment, Chicago Tribune, December 4, 2001,
available at 2001 WL 30798221 (judge sexually harassed four female prosecutors).
130
See In the Matter of the Complaint Against Seraphim, 97 Wis.2d 485, 294 N.W.2d 485 (1980)
(secretary at public defender’s office).
131
See In re the Matter of Honorable Mark S. Deming, 736 P.2d 639 (Wash. 1987) (judge harassed
county district court probation personnel); In re Richard D. Cicchetti, 743 A.2d 431 (Pa. 2000) (judge
harassed female probation officer).
132
See In re Richard D. Cicchetti, 743 A.2d 431 (Pa. 2000) (judge made repeated unwanted phone
calls to court reporter and asked her for dates).
133
See In the Matter of the Complaint Against Seraphim, 97 Wis.2d 485, 294 N.W.2d 485 (1980)
(judge sexually harassed employee of private social services agency).
134
See Inquiry Concerning Judge W. Jackson Willoughby, California Commission on Judicial
Performance, June 27, 2000, available at http://cjp.ca.gov/CNCensureRTF/WilloughbyCNCN_06-2700.rtf (judge engaged in improper and unwanted touching of bailiff’s breasts).
135
See Inquiry Concerning Judge W. Jackson Willoughby, California Commission on Judicial
Performance, June 27, 2000, available at http://cjp.ca.gov/CNCensureRTF/WilloughbyCNCN_06-27-00.rtf
(judge made kissing gestures towards his administrative clerk and told her he wanted her to “sit there and
look pretty”); Wren Propp, Court Suspends Mora Magistrate, Albuquerque Journal, April 10, 2003,
available at 2003 WL 18623941 (county magistrate accused of sexually harassing administrative clerk); In
re the Matter of Honorable Mark S. Deming, 736 P.2d 639 (Wash. 1987) (judge sexually harassed docket
clerk).
136
In re the Matter of Honorable Mark S. Deming, 736 P.2d 639 (Wash. 1987) (judge sexually
harassed law student intern).
137
See Tiffany Y. Latta, Charges Pending Against Judge, Columbus Dispatch, June 14, 2003,
available at 2003 WL 57336738 (judge charged with sexually harassing secretary).
138
See Christopher Goffard, Memos in Harassment Case are Public, Court Rules, St. Petersburg
Times, February 14, 2003, available at 2003 WL 12204666 (judicial assistants); Christine Mahr, Judge’s
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Bias, Prejudice and Insensitivity. Bad judges display bias, prejudice, and
stereotypical thinking. In criminal cases, they manifest prejudice against the
prosecution142 and the accused.143 They display sexist attitudes against both women144
and men.145 They insult a melting pot of groups including African Americans,146

Hearing Canceled; Settlement Proposed, Desert Sun, October 19, 2002, available at 2002 WL 25960154
(court employee).
139
See In the Matter of the Complaint Against Seraphim, 97 Wis.2d 485, 294 N.W.2d 485 (1980)
(judge behaved in sexually aggressive manner towards journalism student).
140
See In the Matter of the Proceeding Pursuant to Section 44, subdivision 4, of the Judiciary Law, in
Relation to Robert N. Going, a Judge of the Family Court, Montgomery County, New York State
Commission on Judicial Conduct, December 29, 2000, available at
http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Determinations/G/going(2).htm (judge harassed law clerk after termination of
romantic relationship between them).
141
See, e.g., Fawn Germer, Intrigue, Investigations Embroil a Courthouse; From Public Defender to
Chief Judge, Allegations Seem Epidemic in Florida’s Hillsborough County, Washington Post, August 9,
2000, available at 2000 WL 19623310 (judge sent email to fellow jurist suggesting liaison).
142
See, e.g., In re Duckman, 677 N.Y.S.2d 248, 92 N.Y.2d 141, 699 P.2d 872 (1998) (judge
improperly dismissed charges against criminal defendants and verbally humiliated prosecutors), Ralph
Ranalli and Joanna Weiss, Friends Say Lopez Will Quit Bench, Boston Globe, May 15, 2003, available at
2003 WL 3396366 (judge displayed bias against the prosecutors raising fundamental questions about her
fitness to serve); Gwen Filosa, 2 Felons Sue Courts, New Orleans Times-Picayune, February 28, 2003,
available at 2003 WL 3995220 (judge allegedly improperly allowed more than a thousand suspects go free
without posting bond); Douglas Feiden, Trial and Error in Queens Courts, New York Daily News July 7,
2003 (judge joked when a prosecutor collapsed with chest pains, telling him not to “take it so personally”) .
143
See, e.g., In the Matter of the Proceeding Pursuant to Section 44, subdivision 4, of the Judiciary
Law in Relation to Mark C. Dillon, a Justice of the Supreme Court, Westchester County, New York State
Commission on Judicial Conduct, February 6, 2002 (judge gave a speech after jury verdict lambasting
defense counsel); David Rosenzweig, Judge Removed From Case Over Remark, Los Angeles Times,
March 14, 2001, available at 2001 WL 2469672 (judge questioned credibility of criminal defendants who
testify in their own defense); John Caher, Agency’s Authority to Act Under ‘Spargo’ Clarified:
Prosecutions for Behavior on the Bench May Proceed, New York Law Journal, April 22, 2003 (judge
allegedly engaged in a persistent conduct of “denying rights to counsel, setting unreasonably high bail,
coercing guilty pleas, [and] entering convictions against defendants who were not before him”); Janan
Hanna, Outspoken Judge Will Take Class to Curb Anger, Chicago Tribune, May 9, 2002 (judge interrupted
defense lawyer’s closing arguments 45 times and suggested that defense witnesses were thieves and drug
addicts); Dennis Opatrny, More Than Half of S.F. Bench up for Re-Election, San Francisco Recorder, May
8, 2001 (judge reassigned from criminal cases after being accused of bias by public defender’s office); Ann
W. O’Neill, Appeals Court Criticizes L.A. Judge for ‘Egregious’ Misconduct, Los Angeles Times, May 25,
2000, available at 2000 WL 2244483 (judge created the impression that he was allied with the prosecution).
144
See In re Arthur J. Cieslik, No. 87 CC-2, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at
http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge made “intemperate, rude and sexist remarks to women
attorneys during official proceedings”); In re John R. Goshgarian, No. 98 CC-2, Illinois Judicial Inquiry
Board, available at http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge referred to female judge in a derogatory
and insulting manner).
145
See Michele McPhee, Cases vs. Diamond Dismissed, New York Daily News, April 3, 2003,
available at 2003 WL 4070323 (judge was allegedly so hostile to men in divorce cases that husbands who
had appeared before her formed a support group and filed complaints of judicial misconduct); Douglas
Feiden, Trial and Error in Queens Courts, New York Daily News, July 7, 2003 (judge dispensed
toothbrushes to “deadbeat dads” before packing them off to jail).
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Hispanics,147 Jews,148 Catholics,149 Italian-Americans,150 English,151 Danes,152
Yugoslavians,153 Japanese,154 and otherwise-unidentified undocumented aliens.155 They
look down on poor people,156 harbor animosity against homosexuals,157 and scold or
discriminate against women for being prostitutes,158 unwed mothers,159 welfare

146

See In re Goodfarb, 880 P.2d 620 (Arizona 1994) (“fucking n-----s”); Public Admonishment of
Judge Richard S. Flier, California Commission on Judicial Performance, May 30, 1995, available at
http://cjp.ca.gov/PubAdmRTF/FlierPA_05-30-95.rtf (“good boy”); John Caher, Commuter Tax Fight Next
on Court Agenda, New York Law Journal, February 4, 2000 (“n--- bitch”); Mickey Ciokajlo, Judge
Accused of Misconduct; State Agency Cites Behavior, Remarks in Court, Chicago Tribune, May 16, 2002,
available at 2002 WL 2655613 (“boy”).
147
Karen Dorn Steele, Passing Notes: Judge, Clerk Make Ethnic Slurs; Investigation Prompts
Reprimand, IRE Journal, March 1, 2002, available at 2002 WL 8759893 (judge referred to Hispanics as
“greasers”).
148
See Fredric U. Dicker, Panel Slams Judge’s ‘Bizarre’ Religious Remarks, New York Post,
October 4, 2003, at 2 (Judge insulted lawyer, and when lawyer complained, judge asked if the lawyer was
Jewish”).
149
See Fredric U. Dicker, Panel Slams Judge’s ‘Bizarre’ Religious Remarks, New York Post,
October 4, 2003, at 2 (Judge remarked in open court that he would “never” send his children to Catholic
school – even though he in fact had done so – and stated that in light of press accounts of “what was
occurring in Catholic schools” he would not permit any funds to be used for Catholic education).
150
Karen Dorn Steele, Passing Notes: Judge, Clerk Make Ethnic Slurs; Investigation Prompts
Reprimand, IRE Journal, March 1, 2002, available at 2002 WL 8759893 (judge referred to labor union
representatives as “mafia”).
151
Douglas Feiden, Trial and Error in Queens Courts, New York Daily News July 7, 2003 (judge
engaged in an anglophobic tirade against a defendant of British heritage).
152
Mary Wisniewski, Watching the Watchdogs Watch: The JIB and Courts Commission, Chicago
Lawyer, March 1999 (judge suggested that Danes have loose sexual morals).
153
Mary Wisniewski, Watching the Watchdogs Watch: The JIB and Courts Commission, Chicago
Lawyer, March 1999 (judge made arguably disparaging remarks about Yugoslavians).
154
See In re Richard Haugner, California Commission on Judicial Performance, April 11, 1994,
available at http://www.cjp.ca.gov/PubReprovals/Haugner_PubR_041194.doc (judge made comments that
were insensitive to persons of Japanese ancestry and reflected possible racial or ethnic bias).
155
See H.G. Reza and Christine Hanley, New Trial for O.C. Migrant, Los Angeles Times, June 5,
2003, available at 2003 WL 2415238 (judge displayed such overt bias against undocumented aliens that an
appeals panel found a manifest miscarriage of justice).
156
See, e.g., In re Michelson, 225 Wis. 2d 221, 591 N.W.2d 843 (1999) (bias based on socioeconomic
status).
157
See, e.g., In re Susan J. McDunn, No. 01 CC-2, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at
http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge allegedly sought to thwart lesbian couples seeking
adoptions); Reprimand urged for Judge: Remark on Homosexuals Cited, Biloxi, Miss. Sun-Herald,
December 21, 2002, available at 2002 WL 101468021 (judge wrote letter to the editor suggesting that
homosexuals belong in mental institutions).
158
See In re David Cerda, No 76 CC-2, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at
http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge employed the bail system as a means of punishing
defendants in prostitution cases).
159
Alisa Lapolt, Reprimand, Training Urged for Racine Judge Over Unwed Mother Remarks,
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, November 2, 1998, available at 1998 WL 14049209 (“I suppose it was too
much to ask that your daughter keep her pants on and not behave like a slut”).
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abusers,160 and caregivers.161 Bias against particular organizations is also reported. One
judge fulminated about the ACLU.162 Another asserted that the defendant in a products
liability case “would go to any lengths to make life miserable for somebody.”163
Attitudes towards sex crimes evoke particularlyshocking displays. One judg e
admonished an 11-year old abuse victim that it “takes two to tango.”164 Another labeled
a rape victim as the kind that works men “into a frenzy.”165 A Boston judge described a
man who had kidnapped and attempted to rape an 11-year-old boy as “on a very low
level” compared with other sex offenders.166 Another judge seemed to countenance a
teacher who had an affair with a 13-year-old student, remarking, “[i]t’s just something
between these two people that clicked beyond the teacher-student relationship” and
suggesting that the affair was a way for the victim to “satisfy his sexual needs.” 167
Personal Misconduct. Bad judges display an impressive range of private
foibles.168 They shoplift,169 pass bad checks,170 evade taxes,171 steal from clients,172
160

See In the Matter of Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against the Honorable Ralph
G. Gorenstein, 174 Wis.2d 861, 434 N.W.2d 603 (1989) (judge berated women with minor children for
abusing the welfare system).
161
See, e.g., Fletcher v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 968 P.2d 958 (California 1998) (judge
remarked of an absent attorney, “she probably had something more important to do today, like go to a PTA
meeting”).
162
Stephen Hunt, Remarks by a Judge Upset Attorney, ACLU, Salt Lake Tribune, October 16, 2002,
available at 2002 WL 4272212 (criticizing ACLU for “whining and complaining” rather than helping
people).
163
William Kleinknecht, Appeals Court Finds Bias Against Automaker - Cites Judge’s ‘Antagonism’
in Case of Accident that Left Teen Paraplegic, Newark Star-Ledger, June 4, 2003, available at 2003 WL
18702778.
164
Michael E. Ruane, Md. Judge Warned for Scolding Sex Victim, 11, Washington Post, June 22,
2000, available at 2000 WL 19615927.
165
In Other Words, Las Vegas Review-Journal, August 21, 1999, available at 1999 WL 9291270.
166
See, e.g., Joe Fitzgerald, Apology Now Would be Too Little, Too Late, Boston Herald, April 30,
2003, available at 2003 WL 3023916 (describing how boy was ordered by transsexual to perform a sex act
at the point of a screwdriver).
167
MichaelAnn Knotts, Judge Reprimanded for Sex Case Remarks, New Jersey Lawyer, May 12,
2003.
168
For general treatment, see Steven Lubet, Beyond Reproach: Ethical Restrictions on the
Extrajudicial Activities of State and Federal Judges (1984).
169
See Inquiry Concerning Garrett, 613 So.2d 463 (Florida 1993) (judge shoplifted a VCR from a
Target store); In the Matter of Honorable Berlin Jones, Case No. 99-321, Arkansas Judicial Discipline and
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embezzle from escrow accounts,173 plant evidence,174 make threats,175 extort bribes,176
gamble,177 obstruct justice,178 give misleading testimony,179 breach fiduciary duties,180

Disability Commission, September 21, 2000, available at http://www.state.ar.us/jddc/pdf/JONES.321.PDF
(judge took $10.76 worth of items from hardware store); Liz Fabian, Mayor Will Decide Judge’s Fate
Monday, Macon Telegraph, May 21, 2003, available at 2003 WL 2558398 (judge accused of shoplifting
$80 in groceries from a Kroger store).
170
See, e.g., Inquiry Concerning Judge James I. Aaron, California Commission on Judicial
Performance, July 8, 2002, available at http://cjp.ca.gov/CNCensureRTF/Aaron%207-8-02.rtf (judge
attempted to evade financial obligations by writing worthless checks); In the Matter of the Honorable
Morris W. Thompson, Arkansas Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission, December 6, 1999,
available at http://www.state.ar.us/jddc/pdf/Thompson141.PDF (judge passed 59 bad checks in a four-year
period); Terry Dickson, Hammill Faces New Complaint: Glynn Magistrate’s Removal Sought, Florida
Times-Union, October 19, 2001, available at 2001 WL 25999931 (judge accused of writing more than 40
bad checks on account of his former law practice ); Circuit Judge Is Removed by Justices, Los Angeles
Times, June 2, 2000, available at 2000 WL 2246804 (judge removed from office for offenses including
writing bad checks).
171
See Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission v. Thompson, 16 S.W.3d 212 (Ark. 2000)
(judge willfully failed to pay federal income taxes); In re Robert J. Dempsey, No. 86 CC-1, Illinois Judicial
Inquiry Board, available at http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge failed to report income from his
real estate investments to the IRS or state revenue department); In the Matter of the Complaint Against Van
Susteren, 118 Wis.2d 806, 348 N.W.2d 579 (1984) (judge failed to timely file state individual income tax
returns).
172
In the Matter of the Proceeding Pursuant to Section 44, subdivision 4, of the Judiciary Law in
Relation to Howard R. George, a Justice of the Watertown Town Court, Jefferson County, New York State
Commission on Judicial Conduct, February 4, 2002, available at
http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Determinations/G/george_2002.htm (judge misappropriated funds of
incarcerated client); Sarah Duran, Lawyer Not Sorry he Blabbed, Tacoma News Tribune, May 8, 2002,
available at 2002 WL 3196984 (judge sold property belonging to a former client in exchange for payments
on the judge’s Cadillac).
173
See In the Matter of the Proceeding Pursuant to Section 44, subdivision 4, of the Judiciary Law in
Relation to Edmund G. Fitzgerald, Jr., a Judge of the City Court of Yonkers, Westchester County, New
York State Commission on Judicial Conduct, July 1, 2002, available at
http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Determinations/F/fitzgerald.htm (judge improperly cashed checks for personal
expenses from client escrow account).
174
Dennis Persica, Jeff Judge Arrested in Plot to Plant Drugs, New Orleans Times-Picayune, June 7,
2002, available at 2002 WL 3102493 (judge accused of planting drugs in the vehicle of an enemy).
175
In re John J. McDonnell, No. 73 CC-1, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at
http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge threatened a man and his wife with a handgun); Kara Blond,
Suspended Nassau Judge Disbarred for Conduct, Newsday, December 29, 1998, available at 1998 WL
2699747 (judge sent threatening and harassing letters and faxes to an attorney with whom he was having a
dispute); Ohio Headlines, Dayton Daily News, January 19, 2001, 2001 WL 3826864 (judge sent a
threatening letter to a motorist in a road rage incident); Jean Guccione, Los Angeles Man Seeks Court’s
Protection After Judge’s Threat, Los Angeles Times, October 20, 2002, available at 2002 WL 2512084
(judge accused of making death threats against his daughter’s boyfriend).
176
See In re Judge Joseph A. Jaffe, 814 A.2d 308 (Pa.Ct.Jud.Disc. 2003) (judge indicted for
extortion).
177
See In re Amati, 776 A.2d 371 (Pennsylvania Court of Judicial Discipline 2002) (judge engaged in
illegal gambling).
178
See In re Eagen, 814 A.2d 304 (Pennsylvania Court of Judicial Discipline 2002) (judge attempted
to obstruct grand jury investigation of criminality in which he was involved).
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promote bogus investment schemes,181 forge documents,182 file false police reports183 and
fraudulently procure mortgages.184 They abuse alcohol,185 prescription medications,186
marijuana187 and methamphetamine,188 get arrested for drunk driving,189 and enter rehab
179

Inquiry Concerning Hapner, 718 So.2d 785 (Florida 1998) (judge gave inaccurate, incomplete,
and misleading testimony in a domestic violence proceeding to the effect that she had tape recordings of
her ex-husband making threats of physical violence).
180
See, e.g., Inqu iry Concerning Former Judge William H. Sullivan, May 17, 2002, California
Commission on Judicial Performance, available at
http://cjp.ca.gov/CNCensureRTF/Sullivan%20CN%20Bar%2005-17-02.rtf (judge took unauthorized
personal loans from trust he was administering).
181
See Inquiry Concerning Judge James I. Aaron, California Commission on Judicial Performance,
July 8, 2002, available at http://cjp.ca.gov/CNCensureRTF/Aaron%207-8-02.rtf (judge promoted Ponzi
scheme and evaded financial obligations).
182
See In re Lambros J. Kutrubis, No. 99 CC-3C, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at
http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge forged signature of former friend on numerous tax returns
for judge, his wife and entities in which they had an interest).
183
Brendan Smith, Cases Cover a Wide Range, Albuquerque Journal, February 11, 2002, available at
2002 WL 12685560 (magistrate fired shots at his own car and falsely reported that someone else had done
so); Editorial, New York Daily News, April 4, 2003, available at 2003 WL 4070452 (judge claimed that
she was receiving threatening letters, but the police concluded that she wrote them herself in order to obtain
round-the-clock police protection).
184
See In re Robert L. Sklodowski, No. 87 CC-4, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at
http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge falsely claimed a $15,000 downpayment in mortgage
application to a bank).
185
See, e.g., William R. Levesque, Report Casts Doubt on Judge’s Rehab Program, St. Petersburg
Times, June 4, 2002, available at 2002 WL 20771369 (detailing judge’s continuing problems with alcohol
abuse); A ‘Message’ For McFalls: The High Court Suspends the Judge Without Pay, Pittsburgh PostGazette, April 16, 2002, available at 2002 WL 3810998 (judge attributed bizarre alcohol-induced behavior
to trauma from September 11 terrorist attack); Brendan Smith, Some Judges Run Afoul of the Law,
Albuquerque Journal, February 10, 2002, available at 2002 WL 12685479 (judge allegedly drove under the
influence, left the scene of accident and lied to police officers); Patricia Huang, Panel Recommends
Reprimand for Judge, Newark Star-Ledger, February 9, 2002, available at 2002 WL 13449323 (judge who
had been convicted of driving under the influence presided over six DUI cases and failed to inform his
supervisors of the conviction).
186
See In re Judge Steven D. Lawrence, Arkansas Judicial Discipline & Disability Commission,
DATE, http://www.state.ar.us/jddc/pdf/sanctions/lawrence_12_20_2001.pdf ( ); In Re Appeal of Larsen,
Pennsylvania Law Weekly, November 4, 2002 (judge found to have engaged in conspiracy related to
unlawful acquisition of prescription medications).
187
See, e.g., Summerlin v. Stewart, 267 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2001) (judge flagrantly abused marijuana
while presiding over capital murder trial); In re Frank D. Edwards, No. 96 CC-2, Illinois Judicial Inquiry
Board, available at http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge busted for marijuana possession in
Belize).
188
People Police Log: Az Judge Removed for Misconduct, American Political Network
The Hotline, March 10, 2000 (judge accused of methamphetamine abuse).
189
See, e.g., In the Matter of Michael R. Connor, 589 A.2d 1347 (N.J. 2001)(DUI); Inquiry
Concerning Former Judge Robert C. Bradley, California Commission on Judicial Performance, June 3,
1999, available at http://cjp.ca.gov/CNCensureRTF/BradleyCNCN_06-03-99.rtf (same); In re Honorable
Lee Munson, Arkansas Judicial Discipline & Disability Commission, September 23, 1999, available at
http://www.state.ar.us/jddc/pdf/sanctions/Munson99.204.PDF (same); Don Holland, Panel: Former Judge
Lost Respect, But Can Recover, Los Angeles Daily News, February 26, 1999, available at 1999 WL
7016465 (same); Lisa Teachey, Visiting Judge Makes Apology After Conviction in DWI Case, Houston
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programs at an alarming rate.190 They collect child pornography, 191 solicit prostitutes192
and have sex with mentally disabled people.193 They get into confrontations with
spouses,194 ex-spouses195 and ex-lovers,196 and commit assaults,197 stalking,198 threats199
and rape.200

Chronicle, April 26, 2001, available at 2001 WL 3016370 (same); Richard Marosi, State Panel Rebukes
O.C. Judge in DUI Case, Los Angeles Times, June 21, 2000, available at 2000 WL 2253261 (same).
190
See, e.g., Inquiry Concerning Former Judge Robert C. Bradley, June 3, 1999, California
Commission on Judicial Performance, available at http://cjp.ca.gov/CNCensureRTF/BradleyCNCN_06-0399.rtf (judge spent 28 days at Betty Ford Center); Buddy Nevins and Terri Somers, Judge In Rehab
Program; Decision Comes After Arrest On Alcohol Charge at Beachfront Resort, South Florida SunSentinel, December 11, 2001, available at 2001 WL 29960763 (judge committed herself to an alcohol
rehab program after being charged with drunk and disorderly conduct at resort).
191
See Monte Morin; Jack Leonard, O.C. Judge is Charged With Possession of Child Porn, Los
Angeles Times, November 10, 2001, available at 2001 WL 28927626.
192
See, e.g., In re Koch, 890 P.2d 1137 (Arizona 1995) (judge disciplined after being arrested for
solicitation of prostitution); Linda Kleindienst, Florida Court Orders Reprimand for Judge, Fort Lauderdale
Sun-Sentinel, June 2, 2000, available at 2000 WL 22176766 (judge acquitted of charges of solicitation but
disciplined for attempting to misuse his office after arrest); Court to Decide if Judge Stays on Job;
Allegheny County Justice Charged with Patronizing Prostitutes, Harrisburg Patriot, November 26, 1999,
available at 1999 WL 5161106 (judge offered undercover policewoman $20 for sex).
193
See Justin Walden, Judge May Face State Investigation, Removal From Bench For Sex Charges,
Binghamton Press & Sun-Bulletin, November 14, 2002, available at 2002 WL 101084847 (judge pleaded
guilty to criminal charge of improper contact with a disabled person); In the Matter of the Proceeding
Pursuant to Section 44, subdivision 4, of the Judiciary Law in Relation to Calvin M. Westcott, a Justice of
the Hancock Town Court, Delaware County, New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct, February
3, 2003, available at http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Determinations/W/westcott_2003.htm (judge convicted of
charges related to his sexual contact with a mentally disabled person).
194
In the Matter of Turco, 970 P.2d 731 (Washington 1999) (judge pushed his wife to the ground in
public).
195
See, e.g., Dennis Opatrny, More Than Half of S.F. Bench up for Re-Election, San Francisco
Recorder, May 8, 2001 (in plea agreement to avoid conviction, judge agreed to 52-week domestic-violence
counseling program following confrontation with his estranged wife).
196
See, e.g., In re Koch, 890 P.2d 1137 (Arizona 1995) (judge assaulted his ex-girlfriend); In The
Matter of Judge Rosemarie R. Williams, 165 N.J.L.J. 560 (August 6, 2001) (judge had repeated violent
confrontations with her ex-lover).
197
See Brendan Smith, Some Judges Run Afoul of the Law, Albuquerque Journal, February 10, 2002,
available at 2002 WL 12685479 (magistrate suspended for beating a female companion and then fleeing
from arresting officers).
198
See John J. Goldman, N.Y. Judge Charged in Sex Scandal Keeps His Job, Los Angeles Times,
November 10, 1992, available at 1992 WL 2840869 (New York State Chief Judge Sol Wachtler accused of
stalking and harassment after breakup of romance).
199
See, e.g., In re Koch, 890 P.2d 1137 (Arizona 1995) (judge threatened the life of ex-girlfriend’s
boyfriend).
200
See Magistrates Need Law Degrees, Albuquerque Journal, March 26, 2003, available at 2003 WL
15990158 (magistrate charged with criminal sexual penetration).
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Conflict of Interest. Some judges allow their personal financial interests to come
into conflict with their official responsibilities.201 Conflicts of this sort are inevitable,
especially in smaller towns, and can often be cured with disclosure to and consent from
counsel. However, judges do not always make such disclosures, even with the conflict is
palpable.202 Judges also moonlight by continuing in law practice after being elevated to
the bench.203
Inappropriate Behavior in Judicial Capacity. Bad judges display poor judgment
and inappropriate behaviors when acting in their judicial capacities. They curse in open
court204 and in professional relationships.205 They visit pornographic web sites from
chambers,206 leaf through lingerie catalogs in court,207 ask rape victims for dates,208 and

201

Jose Arballo Jr., Ex-judge Censured by Panel, Riverside Press-Enterprise, May 18, 2002, available
at 2002 WL 21272392 (judge purchased a house from a man whose conservatorship he had processed);
Inquiry Concerning Former Judge William H. Sullivan, May 17, 2002, California Commission on Judicial
Performance, available at http://cjp.ca.gov/CNCensureRTF/Sullivan%20CN%20Bar%2005-17-02.rtf
(judge presided over a probate matter even though he had handled the decedent’s financial affairs,
witnessed her will, and served as backup executor).
202
See, e.g., Huffman v. Arkansas Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission, 42 S.W.3d 386
(Ark. 2001) (judge issued temporary restraining order in favor of Wal-Mart without disclosing that he
owned $700,000 in Wal-Mart stock); In re Honorable Gayle Forde, Case No. 96-311, Arkansas Judicial
Discipline and Disability Commission, available at
http://www.state.ar.us/jddc/pdf/sanctions/Ford96.311.PDF (judge failed to disclose that he leased office
space to an attorney who appeared before him in a case); In re Paul R. Durr, No. 72-CC, Illinois Judicial
Inquiry Board, available at http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge failed to disclose that an attorney
before him was his business partner).
203
This practice is usually prohibited under the terms of the individual’s appointment and violates
applicable codes of judicial conduct. See, e.g., Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission v.
Thompson, 16 S.W.3d 212 (Ark. 2000) (judge sanctioned for practicing law after elevation to bench).
204
See In re John C. Goshgarian, No. 98 CC-2, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at
http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (“fuck you and your office”); In re Goodfarb, 880 P.2d 620, 623
(Arizona 1994) (judge stated that attorneys who could not reach a settlement had their “brains fucked up” );
Matter of the Proceeding Pursuant to Section 44, Subdivision 4, of The Judiciary Law, In Relation to J.
Kevin Mulroy, a Judge of the County Court, Onondaga County, New York Law Journal, August 23, 1999
(“[w]hy don't you give this guy a fucking misdemeanor so I can get out of this fucking black hole of
Utica”).
205
See In re John C. Goshgarian, No. 98 CC-2, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at
http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge used profanity in referring to other judges).
206
See, e.g., Inquiry Concerning Former Judge Vincent J. McGraw, California Commission on
Judicial Performance, April 3, 2003, http://cjp.ca.gov/CNCensureRTF/McGraw%204-3-03.rtf ( ); David
Ashenfelter, Removal Suggested for Judge, Detroit Free Press, February 11, 2003, available at 2003 WL
2542382 (judge used court computers to visit pornographic Internet sites).
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have sex with bailiffs,209 secretaries,210 law clerks,211 court reporters,212 paroled felons,213
and spouses of defendants awaiting sentencing.214
Bad judges are seduced by publicity. Some serve as their own press agents.215
Others act star-struck. California judge Judith C. Chirlin presided over a celebrity trial in
which Main Line Cinemas accused actress Kim Basinger of breach of contract for
backing out of the movie “Boxing Helena.” After the studio prevailed at trial, and while
the case was on appeal, Judge Chirlin attended the premiere of the movie and postpremiere reception as a guest of the plaintiff.216 Comments to the media can also be a
trap, as federal district judge Penfield Jackson discovered when the court of appeals ruled

207

See Robert Becker, State Ousts Judge, Cites Harassment, Chicago Tribune, December 4, 2001,
available at 2001 WL 30798221 (after leafing through lingerie catalog, judge showed it to female state’s
attorney and asked, “what do you think of this one?” ).
208
Jean Guccione, Judge’s Outside Contact With Victim Questioned, Los Angeles Times, November
18, 2000, available at 2000 WL 25919439 (judge asked rape victim to dinner after sentencing her attacker
to life in prison).
209
See Lyda Longa, Prosecutor Finishes Inquiry of Judge, Tampa Tribune, May 2, 2001, available at
2001 WL 5501151 (grand jury criticized a judge for having affair with bailiff).
210
See In re Keith E. Campbell, No. 87 CC-3, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at
http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge had a long-standing personal, romantic and sexual
relationship with his judicial secretary and fired her when she discontinued the relationship).
211
See In the Matter of the Proceeding Pursuant to Section 44, subdivision 4, of the Judiciary Law, in
Relation to Robert N. Going, a Judge of the Family Court, Montgomery County, New York State
Commission on Judicial Conduct, December 29, 2000, available at
http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Determinations/G/going(2).htm (judge had affair with his law clerk).
212
See In re Oliver Spurlock, No. 98 CC-1, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at
http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge had sex in chambers with court reporter).
213
In re Harris, 713 So.2d 1138 (Louisiana 1998) (judge had an extramarital affair with a felon who
was released on parole pursuant to a sentence that the judge herself had imposed).
214
See Jurist Disqualifies Self in Ex-Judge’s Case, Los Angeles Times, October 3, 2000, available at
2000 WL 25903128 (judge had sexual relations with the wife of a defendant who was awaiting sentencing
in his court on kidnapping charges).
215
See In re Samuel G. Harrod, III, No. 80 CC-2, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, available at
http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm (judge mass-m ailed news clips, press releases, and other materials
using the county postage machine for franking).
216
See Public Admonishment of Judge Judith C. Chirlin, August 28, 1995, California Commission on
Judicial Performance, http://cjp.ca.gov/PubAdmRTF/ChirlinPA_08-28-95.rtf.
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that he had committed judicial misconduct by speaking to reporters about the
government’s antitrust case against Microsoft.217
Judges sometimes treat their courtrooms as personal space. One judge displayed
a crucifix in his courtroom.218 Another distributed religious literature to jurors.219 A
New York judge reportedly made arrangements for his grandson’s bris over the telephone
in open court with a jury seated and a witness on the stand.220 Several judges brought
loaded revolvers to court.221 One Arkansas judge was in the habit of leaning back in his
chair, putting his feet on the desk, and spitting chewing tobacco into a cup.222 An
Oklahoma judge allegedly ate raw hamburger on the bench.223 The bench caneven be an
opportunity to catch up on sleep.224
Sometimes, judges act out of what they conceive to be high spirits or a sense of
fun. A California judge sang to criminal defendants, explaining that she had a “happy
heart.”225 Another maintained a “joking relationship” with a court administrator

217

See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 107-17 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 952
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available at http://www.state.ar.us/jddc/pdf/sanctions/Inboden1.273.PDF.
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available at 2002 WL 103885756.
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Stuart Pfeifer, Commission Chides Orange County Judge, Los Angeles Times, June 27, 2000,
available at 2000 WL 2254972.
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involving numerous incidents of pranks and sexual banter.226 A Nevada judge played
“Jail House Rock” and other prison-themed songs to suspects awaiting arraignment.227 A
Nebraska judge lit off fireworks in a colleague’s bathroom.228 A California judge had a
deputy sheriff handcuff the court interpreter as a joke punishment for lateness.229 Still
another judge, upon learning the defendant had a snake phobia, introduced a rattlesnake
head into his cell, triggering an anxiety attack.230
Lack of Candor. Bad judges are untruthful. They fabricate their backgrounds in
order to obtain their appointments,231 fail to be forthright in applications for service on
the bench,232 are evasive in responding to required periodic disclosures of financial
transactions and interests,233 neglect to inform the authorities about criminal
convictions,234 and misrepresent the status of their dockets in order to avoid
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See Inquiry Concerning Judge John B. Gibson, California Commission on Judicial Performance,
January 28, 2000, available at http://www.cjp.ca.gov/PubAdmRTF/GibsonPA_01-28-00.rtf (judge wrote a
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See Richard Marosi, State Panel Rebukes O.C. Judge in DUI Case, Los Angeles Times, June 21,
2000, available at 2000 WL 2253261 (judge admonished for failing to report DUI conviction to failing to
report his state Commission on Judicial Performance).
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acknowledging backlogs.235 When accused of misconduct, they lie to the police,236 the
press,237 and disciplinary authorities.238 They fail to cooperate with investigators, 239
behave in a contumacious manner in formal misconduct hearings,240 and intimidate,241
suborn,242 or retaliate against243 witnesses.
Electioneering and Purchase of Office. Bad judges engage in inappropriate
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See In the Matter of Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against Dreyfus, 182 Wis.2d 121, 513
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political conduct.244 They volunteer for partisan activities while on the bench245 and
dispense lucrative appointments in order to curry favor with party leaders.246 Judges, law
clerks and other courthouse workers who owe their appointments to party patronage are
expected to attend expensive fundraising dinners for the dominant political party.247
Some judges simply buy their nominations. In Brooklyn, the Democratic Party
leadership reportedlysold judgeships for $50,000, with the bribes being distributed up
and down the party food chain.248 Suspicion of purchase of office also arises when
judges pay “consultation fees” to politically connectedfirms at the request of party
leaders.249
Where party nomination alone is not sufficient to guarantee victory, judges need
cash and volunteers in order to conduct their campaigns. Sometimes, judges violate legal
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Usually, the office in question is another judgeship (or retention in the judge’s current position).
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limits on contributions.250 Even if they stay within the law, there is a perhapsunavoidable suspicion that they will favor those who provided campaign help.251 Judges
running for office may also wish to promote themselves in the public eye and to take
positions on politically controversial issues. Whether or not such activities constitute a
person as a bad judge, they are subject to discipline in many jurisdictions252 (although a
state’s power to impose a sanction is constrained by the first amendment).253
II. The Policy Tradeoff
Fundamental to the American system of government is the proposition that the
judicial branch should be independent from the political branches of government.

250

See Martha Carr, Green Gave Contribution Back, Says Treasurer, New Orleans Times-Picayune,
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employee).
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Amendment, and Judges as Politicians, 21 Yale Law & Policy Review (2003).
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29

Independence safeguards the public against governmental oppression or expropriation
and protects against corruption of the administration of justice by private interests. At the
same time, judges wield enormous authority including the power of judicial review.
Accordingly, their independence cannot be unlimited. They must be accountable to the
public through some type of democratic process. The tradeoff between independence and
accountability is unavoidable254 and forms a central problematic for American
constitutional theory.255
Less commonly recognized is a different set of tradeoffs involving quality of
judicial action. Judicial independence requires that judges be insulated from oversight
and control by parties outside of the judicial branch.256 Thus judges serve for substantial
terms of office, may not be removed except for gross misconduct, and (at least at the
federal level) enjoy protection against diminution in their salaries. The expression of
judicial independence has gone even beyond the concept that the judicial branch must be
protected against intrusions by the political branches. In practical implementation, it
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entails granting trial courts substantial autonomy even from oversight and control within
the judicial branch.257 American trial judges are satraps with powers small in extent but
vast within the ambit of their potency.
The independence of American trial judges interacts in a complex way with the
quality of their work product. On the one hand, independence is itself a qualityenhancing policy. If judges are not independent, they will be subject to influence that
could distort the outcomes of cases, skew the development of substantive law, and detract
from public confidence in the judicial system. Along this dimension, independence is
positively correlated with quality. On the other hand, independence also comes with a
cost. Power unchecked becomes power abused. A corporate executive who performs
badly can be penalized by receiving lower compensation or suffering a demotion, and
must be prepared to receive criticism from others in a team setting. But in a world of
perfect judicial independence, such constraints would not apply to trial judges. Even if
they perform badly, they would still receive deference from lawyers who appear before
them, would still retain the status, salary, and perquisites of office, and would still be
emperors of their small domains. Human beings in robes,258 judges shirkwhen they can
get away with it.259
Accountability also interacts with quality of judicial action. Like independence,
accountability is partially justified as a performance-enhancing measure. It provides a
method for penalizing judges who provide poor service to the public. Judges who are
257

See, e.g., Urquhart v. Davis, 19 S.W.3d 21 (Ark. 2000) (“independence of the bench in our
judicial system requires that the trial judge control his docket and the disposition of matters filed”).
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known to be corrupt, abusive, or biased can be voted out of office; and those who are
unqualified may not be elected. Accountability also provides a democratic check in the
substantive development of the law, at least at the higher levels of the judiciary. A judge
who is too liberal or too conservative, too coddling of criminals or too favorable toward
the prosecution, can face criticism for those decisions and possible sanction from the
voters.
At the same time, the value of accountability can harm quality. If judges were
completely “accountable” in a political sense, they would become passive tools of the
popular will. The coherence, consistency, and durability of legal rules would be
threatened, and protection of minority rights undermined. Moreover, with accountability
comes politics, and with politics comes electioneering, influence-peddling, interest
groups, patronage and corruption. Thus accountability too is a double-edged sword as far
as quality is concerned.
The problem for public policy is to devise structures of governance and authority
that minimize the total costs associated with these parameters.260 It should be evident
that there is no corner solution. We cannot afford to sacrifice any one of these values in
order to enhance the others. Any sensible policy will seek to preserve a substantial level
of each. The issue is how to structure a cost-effective mix of strategies taking account of
all the competing values.
III. Existing Approaches
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As well as others, such a efficiency, which would need to be considered in an complete theory of
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Any solution to the problem of bad judges, all agree, lies in the process of
selection, retention, supervision and removal.261 The options fall into three broad
categories: case-specific public remedies; systemic publicremedies; and p rivate
remedies.
A. Case-Specific Public Remedies
Impeachment. Impeachment is the traditional means for dealing with offending
judges. It was the sole mechanism in the states until the advent of judicial disciplinary
commissions in the 1960s262 and remains the only way to remove a federal judge.263
Impeachment has the value that it is a well-recognized, traditional method for
disciplining bad judges. If grounded in a constitution, it poses no problems under
doctrines of separation of powers. It is also a high-profile process with significant
opportunities for public participation and input.
Impeachment is not a satisfactory solution to the problem of bad judges, however.
Legislators usually don’t want to get involved in the impeachment business, which is
distracting and offers few political payoffs. The only recent judicialimpeachments of
note in the states were those of New Hampshire Justice David Brock in 2000 (which
resulted in an acquittal)264 and Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice Rolf Larsen in 1993
(which resulted in a conviction).265 At the federal level, only three federal judges have
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For the classic study, see Evan Haynes, The Selection and Tenure of Judges (1944). A recent
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America’s Courts (2000).
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See U.S. Const. Art. III, § 1 (federal judges serve during “good behavior); id. Art. I, § 2, cl. 5
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See Holly Ramer, Judges Criticized for Aiding Boss, AP Online, April 26, 2001, available at 2001
WL 19779728.
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See Jerome C. Meites and Steven F. Pflaum, Justice James D. Heiple: Impeachment and the
Assault on Judicial Independence, 29 Loyola University of Chicago Law Journal 741 (1999) (describing
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been impeached in the past half century: Harry E. Claiborne, Alcee L. Hastings and
Walter L. Nixon.266 Each was convicted and removed. The relatively small number of
impeachments suggests that the remedy is ineffective as a general approach to the bad
judges problem.267 Impeachment, moreover, is an all-or-nothing remedy: a judge is
either convicted and removed, or acquitted and allowed to remain in office. These polar
choices limit the possibilities for administering sanctions short of removal in cases where
the judge’s conduct is subject to censure but not of sufficient gravity to warrant the
constitutional penalty.268
Impeachment inevitably threatens judicial independence. Although in recent
times judges have not been impeached for overtly political reasons, this has not always
been the case. The impeachment of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase was
partially an effort by political adversaries to destroy a hated rival.269 Politically
motivated demands to impeach Chief Justice Earl Warren were heard during the 1960s,270

Larson case). A committee of the Illinois House of Representatives investigated impeachment charges
against Chief Justice James D. Heiple in 1997 but recommended that no action be taken. See id.
266
See Jonathan Turley, The Executive Function Theory, The Hamilton Affair, and Other
Constitutional Mythologies, 77 North Carolina Law Review 1791, 1834-1837 (1999) (providing a history
of federal judicial impeachments).
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to avoid impeachment. See See Jonathan Turley, The Executive Function Theory, The Hamilton Affair,
and Other Constitutional Mythologies, 77 North Carolina Law Review 1791, 1837-1841 (1999) (describing
instances where federal judges resigned rather than face impeachment).
268
The formal restriction on sanction, however, is not quite as severe a limitation as may appear at
first blush. Even if a judge is not convicted, an impeachment is a black mark to be avoided if possible.
And even if the investigating body does not refer an impeachment to the trier of fact, it may issue a report
scathing the judge, as happened in Illinois during the investigation into charges against Chief Justice
Heiple. See Jerome C. Meites and Steven F. Pflaum, Justice James D. Heiple: Impeachment and the
Assault on Judicial Independence, 29 Loyola University of Chicago Law Journal 741 (1999) (reproducing
Illinois House committee report recommending against impeachment).
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and President Andrew Johnson (1992) (Chase impeached in part because he attempted to enforce Sedition
Act).
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Criminal Justice Legacy, 90 Georgetown Law Journal 685, 693 (2002) (discussing John Birch Society’s
campaign to impeach Chief Justice Warren).
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and candidates continue to call for impeachment of judges who issue unpopular
decisions.271
Impeachment is limited to gross misconduct.272 It is not an effective remedy for
dealing with judges who are incompetent, irritable, or ideologically biased, nor does it
address cases of private misconduct by judges unless the offenses are severe.
Impeachment, moreover, works only for judges in high positions (such as the
jurisdiction’s supreme court); it does not work for the low-level posts where bad judging
is most frequently observed.
Recusal and Disqualification. Another remedy is for the concerned party to seek
a judge’s removal from the case. The basis for such removal could be either recusal or
disqualification. Disqualification tends to be based on relatively precise criteria, is
nondiscretionary, and in general cannot be waived by the parties. Recusal is a more
generalized obligation or power of a judge to remove herself for a specified reason or
even for no reason at all.273
Recusal and disqualification are useful remedies for certain types of bad judging.
They can be effective at screening out judges who have a financial or personal interest in
the litigation. They can also police, albeit imperfectly, against judges whose involvement
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Presidential candidate Robert Dole called for the impeachment of federal judge Harold Baer after
the latter suppressed evidence seized by police in a traffic stop. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Hill Republicans
Target ‘Judicial Activism’; Conservatives Block Nominees, Threaten Impeachment and Term Limits,
Washington Post, September 14, 1997, available at 1997 WL 12886568.
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question of recusal).
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in a case has become overly personal or adversarial. However, recusal and
disqualification are far from a complete solution to the bad judges problem.
Recusal and disqualification are simultaneously over-inclusive and underinclusive. They can operate rigidly and thus exclude judges whose interest in a case
cannot plausibly result in prejudice against a party.274 To the extent recusal and
disqualification are over-inclusive, they can impose unnecessary costs and delay on the
administration of justice, and can be used by parties for strategic purposes rather than to
protect a bona fide interest in avoiding biased results. Even more problematically,
recusal and disqualification do not exclude judges in many situations in which a party
might legitimately want a case tried before a different judge. For example, a lawyer
might suspect a particular judge of being corrupt, but have no hard evidence to back this
up. Mere suspicion of corruption would not provide grounds for recusal and if mentioned
at all might land the attorney in trouble.275 Recusal and disqualification are not available
to challenge a judge on grounds that she is incompetent or dilatory. Nor will these
procedures provide a basis for removing a judge who is waspish or ill-tempered so long
as the abuse is dispensed on an evenhanded basis. They offer little help for litigants
before judges who display poor judgment or inappropriate behaviors. They do nothing
about judges who abuse their positions for personal gain or who behave in their personal
lives in ways reflecting adversely on their capacity in office.
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secure a conviction).
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Recusal and disqualification do not even address many cases where the judge
might in fact be prejudiced. Judges known to favor a particular ideological point of view
are not subject to recusal for that reason alone, even when the case before them
implicates the very values for (or against) which the judge has fought during her
professional life. Animosity or partiality developed in a proceeding will also generally
not be a sufficient ground for exclusion.276 Even if a trial judge has displayed hostility
towards a party or her attorney, this fact alone would not be sufficient to require recusal
unless it evidences such deep-seated bias or antagonism as to make fair judgment
impossible. Recusal is also not generally required merely because the judge has accepted
campaign contributions from an attorney or litigant.277
Recusal and disqualification place the initial decision in the very judge whose
removal is sought. There is always a risk that the judge will resent having her
impartiality questioned. If the judge does take umbrage and refuses to recuse, the party
who sought disqualification may face hostility for the remainder of the trial.278 Because
denials of motions to recuse or disqualify are interlocutory, the losing party may have no
appeal until after a judgment on the merits.279 Even then, the standard of appellate
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review is usually the deferential “abuse of discretion” test.280 Recusal is thus a high-risk
strategy because of the danger it will be refused. Motions to recuse, moreover, are not
seemly proceedings; they focus the attention of the judge (and sometimes the public) on
the judge’s own failings and biases. They do not enhance public confidence in the legal
system.
Appeal. The right of appeal can correct some of the mistakes of bad judges and
acts as a deterrent against judges making improper rulings in the first place. Appeals can
have the additional virtue of generating a public decision by the appellate tribunal which
can embarrass a bad judge and bring public attention to his or her deficiencies, as well as
warning other judges of the fate that awaits them if they make similar mistakes. Appeals
also preserve judicial independence because the correction of error occurs within the
judicial branch.
The right of appeal, however, is only a partial and limited remedy for the problem
of bad judges.281 Appeals offer relief only when acts of bad judging go to the correctness
of the decision under review. If a judge sexually harasses a staff member, commits an act
of personal misconduct which reflects on capacity in office but does not impeach the
decision in a particular case, or acts inappropriately on the bench in a way that does not
relate to the merits of the decision being appealed, the right of appeal will provide no
redress. Even if the judge makes an error due to incompetence, this may not be subject
to correction on appeal if the standard of review is a deferential one such as abuse of
discretion. Appeals are also costly and protracted, and many litigants may simply accept
peremptory writ restraining trial judge from scheduling further proceedings); text accompanying notes
____ infra.
280
See, e.g., Maez v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel., Inc., 54 F.3d 1488, 1508 (10th Cir.1995) (abuse of
discretion test applies to appeals from denials of motions to recuse).
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a bad decision rather than incur the additional expense and uncertainty. Finally, the right
of appeal is over-inclusive: while it picks up some bad judges, it also captures many
adequate judges who simply make errors (as all judges do), or even good judges who
decide issues of first impression in a different way than the appellate court. Although
reversal on appeal does provide some information about the capacities of the lower court
judge, it is a noisy signal that cannot reliably separate good judges from bad.
Mandamus. Another method for controlling bad judges is through a writ of
mandamus or other extraordinary relief.282 Mandamus can be most helpful as a check on
trial judges who improperly deny recusal or disqualification motions. The ordinary
procedure would be for a disappointed party to seek interlocutory relief from the
appellate court. Given the difficult situation that a party faces if her motion to recuse or
disqualify is refused, appeals courts generally recognize that a petition for mandamus is
an appropriate way to challenge the trial court’s denial of the motion.283 Mandamus may
also be useful in correcting other instances of bad judging when the trial court has clearly
overstepped the bounds of her powers and adequate relief cannot be obtained through
other means.284
The mandamus procedure, however, is hedged in by significant restrictions.
Mandamus is not a proper remedy for trial court errors on the merits, or even for
281

See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, Regulating Judicial Misconduct and Divining “Good Behavior” for
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Review 233 (1980).
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Litigation, 977 F.2d 764, 777-78 (3d Cir.1992). But see In re City of Detroit, 828 F.2d 1160, 1165-67 (6th
Cir. 1987) (denying right to challenge denials of motions to recuse by petitions for a writ of mandamus).
284
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mandamus upon finding that judge had no good cause to delay ruling on petitioner’s motion for summary
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incompetence. It does not address most instances of judicial misconduct and provides no
remedy for judges who misbehave in their personal lives. Moreover, mandamus does not
generally rectify harms that have already occurred unless the error is ongoing. When
mandamus is available, the standard of review will usually be even more deferential than
the “abuse of discretion” standard that applies on appeal.285 Generally, the petitioner
must show a clear and indisputable right to relief, as where the trial judge has committed
a “clear” abuse of discretion or conduct amounting to a usurpation of authority.286 These
restrictions make mandamus a poor vehicle for dealing with the problem of bad judges
generally.
Liability. Legal liability is another means by which the system could police
against bad judges in a given case.287 A judge who violates a cognizable legal right
entitling a party to relief may be subject to a penalty that could provide a remedy for the
right infringed, deter future misconduct, and embody a public censure of the judge’s
conduct.
Legal liability can punish and deter certain types of misconduct. Outside their
judicial roles, judges are liable just as other citizens for torts, crimes, breaches of
contract, and violation of statutory obligations.288 Even within their judicial roles, judges
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See Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347 (10th Cir. 1995) (higher standard than abuse of discretion applies
to mandamus petitions).
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Mallard v. United States District Court, 490 U.S. 296, 309 (1989) (articulating standards for
granting writ).
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For general discussion, see, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, The Civil Liability of Judges in the United
States, 37 American Journal of Comparative Law 655 (1989); Jeffrey M. Shaman, Judicial Immunity from
Civil and Criminal Liability. 27 San Diego Law Review 1 (1990).
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40

can be liable if they act outside of any colorable claim to jurisdiction,289 if the opposing
party seeks only equitable relief against a continuing course of wrongful judicial
conduct,290 or if the judge engages in criminality in office such as bribery or extortion.291
Legal liability, however, is far from a complete solution to the problem of bad
judges. Much of the conduct in which bad judges engage does not fall into any wellrecognized basis for liability. Judges do not owe fiduciary duties to litigants. They are
not subject to personal liability if they have a conflict of interest in the proceeding.
Similarly, judges owe no personally enforceable duties to avoid erroneous rulings. The
remedies for judicial error are procedures for correcting the outcome of the ruling, not
personal claims against the judge. Nor will a judge, ordinarily, be subject to legal
liability for being rude or displaying inappropriate behavior on the bench.
Even if a judge’s actions would be a basis for liability if performed by an ordinary
person, judicial immunity shields the judge from liability for civil damages for acts
undertaken in an official capacity,292 even when the conduct is malicious or in bad
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faith.293 The broad scope of judicial immunity is illustrated by Mireles v. Waco,294 a
classic bad judge case. The trial judge allegedly authorized law enforcement personnel to
use excessive force in seizing an attorney who failed to appear at a calendar call. The
Supreme Court held that even if excessive force had been used, it did not avail the
plaintiff; the conduct in question was in aid of the court’s jurisdiction and that was
sufficient to establish the judge’s immunity.
Discipline. Another approach to bad judges is to establish procedures for
receiving allegations of judicial misconduct, screening and investigating such complaints,
and imposing an appropriate sanction for verified offenses.295 At the federal level,
responsibility for disciplining judges falls to the Chief Judge of each circuit and to the
circuit Judicial Councils. Under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980,296 any
person may file a written complaint with the clerk of the relevant court of appeals
containing a brief statement of the facts upon which the complaint is based. 297 The clerk
is required to promptly transmit the complaint to the Chief Judge of the circuit as well as
to the judge whose conduct is questioned. The Chief Judge screens the complaint and
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either dismisses it,298 finds that an appropriate corrective action has already been taken,
or refers the matter to a special committee.299 If the third option is chosen, a committee
consisting of the Chief Judge and an equal number of circuit and district judges
investigates the complaint and reports its findings to the Judicial Counsel of the circuit,
which presumably then undertakes an appropriate intervention to redress the problem.300
All states and the District of Columbia have also created agencies tasked with
articulating standards for proper judicial conduct301 and investigating and sanctioning
misconduct.302 Commission members are drawn from the judiciary, the bar, and the
general public.303 In some states, the judicial conduct commission has only the power to
recommend punishments (other than informal sanctions such as admonishments).304 In
other states the commission itself has sanctioning authority. In some cases, there are two
commissions – one to investigate and prosecute complaints, the other to act in a judicial
capacity to determine punishment.305
These judicial disciplinary bodies have significantly improved policing against
bad judges. They maintain staff knowledgeable in disciplinary matters and professionally
tasked with responsibility for maintaining the integrity and quality of the judicial system.
298
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Because they have available to them a wide range of possible sanctions, they are able to
devise punishments suitable for the offense. Unlike other approaches to bad judges, their
purview extends to the full range of problems of bad judging identified earlier in this
paper.
However valuable their contribution, these bodies are not a complete solution to
the bad judges problem. Partly because they do not report to any other governmental
body, they are often charged with being overly lax and, in effect, captured by the judges
they are purportedly policing.306 Critics point out that state disciplinary commissions
dismiss the vast majority of complaints filed without even holding a hearing.307 When
sanctions are meted out, they are usually minor: admonishments,308 reprimands,
reprovals,309 censures,310 or transfers to another court. The harshest sanction, dismissal
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from office, is rare.311 State judicial disciplinary commissions are also seen as lacking
the resources to act as effective enforcers. They typically operate with restricted
budgets,312 have limited full-time staffs,313 and often do not employ full-time
investigators.314 Commission members serve on a near-volunteer basis, receiving only
per diem and expense compensation.315 Fair or not, the perception that these
commissions are relatively toothless both undermines their authority and reduces their
effectiveness at maintaining public confidence in the judicial system.
It would be possible to upgrade the potency of these commissions, for example by
increasing their budgets or mandating more onerous sanctions. In some cases, increases
in funding or powers could be beneficial. It is not clear, however, that such changes
would always help. Increased budgets and staff have to be paid for somehow, either
through taxes or cutbacks in other services. Further, as the size and budgets of these
commissions increase, and as they get career staff, they themselves may become
entrenched bureaucracies more devoted to maintaining their positions and perquisites
than to maintaining the quality of the judicial system. There are also dangers with
enhanced sanctions and standards of conduct. The judicial task is discretionary, and it
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could be inadvisable to chill the judge’s exercise of judgment or her ability to control the
conduct of litigation. Moreover, if sanctions become too severe or the standards for
judicial conduct set too high, good judges may leave the bench in order to avoid the risk
of being penalized for actions taken in good faith, and excellent candidates might be
deterred from seeking to replace them.
Exacerbating the perception that judicial conduct commissions are too cozy with
judges is the suspicion of the secrecy in which they operate. The federal statute requires
that “all papers, documents, and records of proceedings relating to investigations . . .
shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed by any person in any proceeding.”316
State commissions also typically meet in secret, unless the matter is deemed serious
enough to warrant a public hearing.317 They do not disclose the names of judges against
whom complaints are filed unless the allegations result in a sanction.318 The perception
of excessive secrecy in these commissions might be addressed by measures mandating
greater transparency. But if all complaints against judges were publicly disclosed, no
matter how frivolous, the effects could be counterproductive: the dignity of the judiciary
could be undermined, public confidence in the rule of law could be impaired, and judges
316
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could feel intimidated in the performance of their tasks. It may be that existing
protections of confidentiality draw a reasonable line between competing policy
considerations.
Finally, increasing the powers and authority of judicial disciplinary commissions
carries a threat to judicial independence.319 The inevitable conflicts between the
commissions and judges under investigation can arouse suspicion that the commissions
are acting in a vengeful or vindictive way.320 The jurisdictions of these commissions can
also spark problems. While it is appropriate for them to investigate allegations of judicial
misconduct, it is out of bounds to criticize judges for the merits of decisions.321 But the
line between these two is always clear-cut.322
B. Public Systematic Remedies
Electoral Reforms. Numerous reforms have been proposed to improve the
procedures for electing judges and thereby select better candidates for the bench.
One possible approach would be to reduce the influence of party leaders in
selecting candidates for election to the bench.323 Improvements in the nominating
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process, however, are unlikely to generate real results so long as the ultimate decision is
left in the hands of the parties. New York law requires that the parties nominate judges at
conventions.324 The idea was that by opening the process to the public, nomination by
backroom deal would be replaced with a more open and democratic system. In practice,
the nominating conventions are little more than travesties. Bosses stack them with
cronies whose sole responsibility is to rubber stamp the party’s choices.325 The delegates
know nothing about the candidates and the convention itself takes less than an hour.
Another approach would be to prohibit political parties from publicly endorsing
candidates for judicial elections. Such prohibitions are unlikely to survive attack under
the first amendment.326 Nonpartisan ballots, however, probably would survive
constitutional scrutiny so long as political parties are not prohibited from supporting
candidates outside the ballot.327 But removing party endorsements from the ballot is not
necessarily a sensible idea. Without party endorsement – however noisy that signal may
be – many voters would be clueless as to the identities or qualifications of the candidates.
People would vote on the basis of someone’s name, gender, or perceived ethnicity. 328
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The party can at least be held accountable to some extent if the judges it recommends
turn out to be stinkers.
Campaign finance reform is also on the table in many states. The idea here is that
the imperative to raise campaign funds distracts judges from their proper tasks, opens
them to influence, and damages public respect for the judiciary.329 Some states have
imposed limits on contributions to judicial campaigns.330 Public financing for judicial
elections might also address some of these concerns.331 But campaign finance reform is
far from a panacea. If voters are apathetic and uninformed, public funding will not
address the underlying problem. Public funding is expensive, doesn’t eliminate
unaffiliated expenditures, and doesn’t deal with incompetent, abusive or venal judges.
Perhaps most importantly, it does not address the domination of the process by party
leaders and could exacerbate the problem by increasing the pool of money which bosses
could siphon off for their own purposes.
Executive Appointment. Executive appointment of judges is not a reform; it is the
traditional means by which judges have been selected in the United States. In light of the
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widespread adoption of judicial elections, however, executive appointment now has a
place in the list of policy options along with other means for judicial selection.332
Executive appointment has the advantage that accountability for bad
appointments can be tagged to the president or governor who selects the judge.
Procedures for confirmation by a legislative body (in the case of the federal government,
the Senate) provide an additional screen against bad quality.
On the other hand, executive appointment has obvious problems. Because judges
typically serve for longer terms than the official who nominates them, the check of
accountability is diluted by the fact that the nominating official will usually be out of
office by the time a judge’s inadequacies come to light. Unless the nominating official
wants to create a legacy for her administration (a factor that may have some salience in
the case of the federal judiciary), quality may be eclipsed by expediency.
The process of legislative confirmation, while it may act as a partial check on
quality, also introduces partisan considerations into the appointment process.
Centralization of accountability is diluted when a nomination goes to a collective body.
If the confirming body is dominated by a different political party than the nominating
official, moreover, the confirmation process may be used as an opportunity to embarrass
or punish a political adversary. Interest groups can become active around high-profile
appointments.333 If the nominating officer wants to avoid a bruising partisan battle, she
may simply nominate a mediocre person with unimpeachable credentials and no “track
332
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record” of writings or speeches that might be taken out of context and used for political
ammunition. Finally, and perhaps most saliently, the executive appointment process
appears most effective at weeding out unqualified candidates for appellate courts.
Candidates for trial court judgeships do not receive the same attention.334 Thus, the
appointment process may do little to police against bad judges at the trial level where the
problem appears principally centered.
Merit Selection. Another approach is to replace political appointments (whether
by election or executive nomination) with an ostensibly nonpolitical process in which
judges are selected on the basis of merit.335 Merit selection of judges at the state level has
been on the policy agenda for nearly a century, and began to be adopted beginning with
Missouri in 1940.336 The Missouri Plan provides that the appointing authority (usually
the governor) picks judges from a list of qualified candidates proposed by aselection
committee.337 The selection committees are typically composed of attorneys, lay
members, and judges. Members of the selection committees are usually appointed by the
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governor.338 Merit selection systems introduce electoral politics into the picture at the
stage of retention. Judges are re-evaluated by the commissions at this stage, and then run
for retention in a public election.339 Thereafter, they serve for extended terms prior to
another retention election.
Merit selection addresses several important problems. Candidates for judicial
office who lack basic knowledge of the law are unlikely to be appointed in merit
selection states. Similarly, individuals with reputations for being intemperate or abusive
may be weeded out during the vetting process that accompanies merit selection. Judicial
candidates who have poor ethics might also be identified and excluded. Most
importantly, if a merit selection process works well, the influence of political insiders
may be reduced.
Although it offers significant benefits over overtly political selection, merit
selection is not a panacea for the bad judges problem. Under existing merit selection
programs, the vetting process takes place most intensively at the stage of initial
appointment, where judicial candidates may be able to disguise their deficiencies. Once
appointed, they can manifest bad qualities with only minimal concern that they will be
ousted. Vetting of sitting judges tends to be less intensive than the initial investigation.
The judge must run for retention, but the outcome is usually preordained because there is
no opposing candidate.340 At this stage there is no rival who has a strong incentive to
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bring the candidate’s deficiencies to light, both because the public would probably not
pay attention and because the rival would not necessarily be appointed if the judge lost
her bid for retention.
Although sometimes touted as a means for limiting the influence of interest
groups in judicial elections,341 merit selection can be captured by special interests.342
Service on selection panels is a low visibility activity. Interest groups can influence the
appointing authority to pick their members for the selection committee. The committee,
in turn, may select judges not on intrinsic merit, but rather out of a wish to accommodate
the demands of competing interests within its ranks. Even if interest groups do not
control appointments, moreover, the governor may select members of selection panels for
political reasons. The merit of judicial candidates is only as good as the quality of the
persons serving on the selection committee. Patronage and backroom deals are possible
in merit selection systems.
Finally, merit selection sacrifices some degree of accountability. If judges are
selected by people who are not themselves accountable to the electorate, the democratic
check on appointments is diluted. Retention elections are not an effective bow to
democratic principles given that they generate a vote in favor of retention in the vast
majority of cases. Perhaps because of their non-democratic features, merit selection
plans encounter surprising public resistance. Despite widespread perceptions that elected
judges are less independent, judicial election of judges continues to be popular.343
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Publicity. Another possible systematic reform for dealing with bad judges is to
increase public disclosure about judges. Such disclosure could take a number of forms.
One option would be to disclose more information about disciplinary actions
against judges. Such information could be used in elections and could also provide a
deterrent to judges who do not want their peccadilloes brought to light. As noted above,
however,344 increasing the information available about the activities of judicial
disciplinary panels is a two-edged sword. It would certainly increase public
accountability and knowledge about judges. On the other hand, the public may give too
much weight to minor infractions, especially in systems with elected judges where
opponents may attempt to take any sort of discipline out of context and turn it into a
campaign issue. If all disciplinary measures were publicized, the disciplinary panels
would lose an important gradation in their ability to design punishments suitable for the
offense. Publicity may also increase the adversarialness of proceedings and may induce
judges to be lesscooperative with commi ttee investigations. Further, if all sanctions for
even minor offenses were reported, the public might overestimate the frequency and
seriousness of judicial misconduct, eroding public respect for the law and the legal
system. Accordingly, while it makes sense to publish the names of judges who receive a
serious sanction, there may be a sound rationale for maintaining the confidentiality of
minor sanctions.
Another option for dealing with bad judges would be to publicize their
administrative performance. In the federal system, for example, each judicial district
must publish biannually a list of judges and the matters pending before them during a
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specified period of time.345 This requirement may shame some judges into speeding up
their work. But it is relatively minor punishment because few people other than fellow
judges will care about the information. Further, a judge’s backlog is not a reliable
indication of quality. A judge whose principal concern is to clear cases off her desk may
have an excellent record for timeliness but still be a bad judge because she does not give
sufficient attention to decisions. Conversely a judge who has a longer- than-usual backlog
may be someone who is scrupulous to make the right decision and to allow litigants full
opportunities to present their cases. Or the apparently dilatory judge may simply have
large or complex cases on her docket.
A third option would be to provide general quality ratings of particular judges.
Several states have instituted official systems of performance rating for judges.
Arizona’s is exemplary. A 1992 amendment to the state constitution instructed the
Supreme Court to institute a system for evaluating judicial performance and to report the
results prior to a judge’s retention election.346 The Supreme Court appointed a
Commission on Judicial Performance Review, composed of thirty individuals, the
majority of whom may not be lawyers or judges.347 The commission evaluates whether
judges meet performance standards related to legal ability, integrity, communication
skills, judicial temperament, administrative performance, and settlement activities. The
commission investigates performance through surveys and other means of obtaining
information from persons who have contact with judges, including litigants, witnesses,
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jurors, court staff, attorneys, and other judges.348 The results of these investigations are
distributed to the public prior to each election in a voter information guide. The
commission also conducts mid-term self-evaluation reviews of judges who are not slated
for retention elections; these are for the judge’s own use and are not made public.349 In
both the retention and mid-term evaluations, the judges themselves fill out survey forms
and meet with a delegation of the committee to develop self-improvement plans.
Information about judicial quality can also be obtained from private sources. All
judges have a reputation among lawyers and fellow judges that ranks them along
dimensions such as skill, integrity, intelligence and fair-mindedness. Newspapers and bar
journals sometimes run stories in which quality of judges is assessed. For judges who
value their reputations as scholars or crusaders, law review commentary can be
influential. In some jurisdictions, trial lawyers give public ratings to judges.350
Public and private quality ratings offer some degree of help on the bad judges
problem, but they suffer from several shortcomings. Merely knowing that a particular
judge has a reputation for quality (or lack of quality) provides little useful information to
parties. They still have to litigate their case. Perhaps knowing that a judge has a bad
temper might cause a lawyer to modulate the vehemence with which she objects to
particular rulings, but overall, knowing that one is before a bad judge does little to cure
the problem.
Quality ratings do offer some value in the process of selection and retention, but
even here their utility can be questioned. In jurisdictions with elected judges, quality
348
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ratings may have some effect in extreme cases, but even bad ratings are unlikely to
prevent many judges from being elected. Most voters care little about judicial
elections,351 which typically offer the level of excitement of a PBS special on tooth
decay.352 Voters are unlikely to pay attention to quality ratings unless the judge’s
misconduct is salacious or extreme. Even with the more permissive attitude recently
displayed among the courts towards judicial campaign speech,353 it is unlikely that
judicial elections will spark public interest. Proposals for improving the quality of
information available to the public thus run into the problem of voter apathy.
Quality ratings could have more of an influence in merit selection states, where
judicial selection panels might find such information useful in selecting candidates. The
problem here is that if the candidate has not previously served as a judge, there will be no
quality ratings available for that person. When quality ratings are available, the judge is
usually running in an unopposed retention election where the chance of ouster is low
even if the judge turns out to be unqualified.
A final problem with quality ratings is that they depend on potentially biased or
incomplete data. Survey data, for example, can be instructive but must reflect a
sufficiently large and unbiased sample of the population to convey reliable information.
Much also depends on the questions asked. Moreover, survey data is not bonded by
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people’s actual behavior. People only have to check boxes in a form. Presumably, a
more reliable marker of quality would be people’s actual behavior with respect to a
particular judge: do litigants seek to avoid a judge or rather affirmatively seek her out?
Such information is not currently available in judicial quality surveys.
Educational Programs. Another approach to the bad judges problem would be a
system of training for jurists.354 Educational programs may be particularly useful in the
case of lower-level judicial officers such as magistrates or justices of the peace, who
sometimes are not attorneys and may not even hold a college degree.355 There are, in
fact, many programs available to judges offering continuing education in matters relevant
to the judicial function. These include programs offered by the Federal Bar Association,
the American Bar Association, universities,356 think tanks and private entities with a wide
range of views and ideologies.357
However, educational programs for judges provide at most a partial fix for the bad
judges problem. There is usually no requirement that judges undergo any educational
preparation for their elevation to the bench.358 Unlike certain foreign countries, in which
354
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service on the judiciary is viewed as a career path involving extensive educational
preparation and possibly an internship with a judge,359 American judges face only
minimal prerequisites for service. Judges are encouraged or required to enroll in
continuing education courses,360 but the requirements tend to be light and can be satisfied
by a wide range of seminars of the judge’s choosing. Most judges obtain their continuing
education on the bench. Ironically, the judges who voluntarily sign up for seminars are
likely to be the ones who need them the least: only judges who are intellectually inclined
are likely to consider it a pleasure to spend a week mooting legal doctrines with
professors. Judges who truly need the educational booster shot will not get it.
Most fundamentally, education alone cannot solve many of the problems of bad
judges. Even brilliant judges behave badly. Consider former New York State Chief
Justice Sol Wachtler, widely viewed as an outstanding intellect and a superbly qualified
jurist.361 Few judges were less in need of continuing education than Judge Wachtler. Yet
when a romance with a New York socialite went awry, Wachtler commenced a disastrous
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course of conduct including extortion, stalking, and kidnapping threats – resulting in a
fall from grace worthy of a Shakespearian tragedy. While intensive psychotherapy might
have prevented Wachtler’s collapse, no amount of continuing judicial education would
have done the job.
C. Remedies Relying on Private Action
Forum Selection. We turn now to remedies relying on private action. One
obvious avenue available to litigants is the option to avoid an undesirable jurist by choice
of forum. A plaintiff can generally bring suit in the court of her choice so long as
requirements of personal jurisdiction and venue are satisfied. Thus, if a plaintiff fears
encountering a bad judge in one forum, she can usually go elsewhere. Defendants have
fewer options, but even they can exercise a substantial degree of forum choice. If they do
not like a particular judge, they can move to transfer the case because of lack of venue or
on grounds of forum non conveniens. If the suit is brought in state court, the defendant
may be able to remove it to federal court. Defendants may even enjoy one advantage as
compared with plaintiffs, in that they will often know the identity of the judge assigned to
their case at the time they face the decision about whether to seek a change of forum.
Forum choice is not a satisfactory answer to the problem of bad judges, however.
To avoid a particular judge, a plaintiff may have to abandon an entire jurisdiction in
which many highly qualified judges also serve. Forum choice can also be costly since the
parties may wind up litigating in an inconvenient court. The grounds for forum choice,
moreover, are only accidentally correlated with the quality of the judge. Removal is
solely jurisdictional:it will not lie to correct even overt bias or prejudice on the part of
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the state judge if grounds for removal are not otherwise present.362 Moreover, the power
of forum choice may exacerbate rather than ameliorate the bad judges problem. Suppose
that a plaintiff’s attorney happens to have an inappropriately close relationship with the
only judge in a particular court. The plaintiff can then use the power of forum choice to
select a judge biased in her favor. Here, forum selection makes matters worse.
Peremptory Challenges. Several states allow litigants to peremptorily challenge
judges.363 In some, the challenge must be accompanied by a lawyer’s affidavit asserting
that a fair and impartial trial cannot be obtained.364 Other states do not require an
allegation of cause.365 In all states with peremptory judicial challenges, pleadings and
motions facially conforming to the requirements of the rules are sufficient to require
immediate replacement of the judge for all future merit-based adjudications,366 at least so
long as a party opposing the challenge cannot establish that it is made in bad faith or for
purposes of delay.367
362
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Peremptory judicial challenges balance fairness to the parties against interests in
preserving judicial efficiency and preventing “judge-shopping.” The latter two concerns
dictate that, in general, each party gets only one challenge – otherwise parties could
continuously challenge judges, thus imposing costs on their adversaries and the judicial
system and preventing adjudications on the merits.368 For similar reasons, peremptory
judicial challenges must be made within a relatively short time after the identity of the
judge is known to the party making the challenge.369
Problems can arise when multiple parties are involved. In such cases, the
peremptory challenge rule needs to be administered with sensitivity to fairness to the
parties while at the same time avoiding the inefficiencies and potential strategic
advantages that could be created if multiple parties on the same side were allowed to
exercise separate challenges. Courts generally address the problem of multiple parties by
allowing parties who are aligned in interest only one peremptory challenge between
them,370 or giving judges discretion to determine a fair number of challenges when the
parties cannot agree.371 Other problems arise when parties who would be entitled to
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peremptory challenges are added late in the litigation; here the courts generally allow the
challenges to go forward.372
Peremptory challenges of judges are a constructive reform with considerable
efficacy as a means for excluding a judge while alleviating some of the onus associated
with having to allege that a judge is unable to provide a fair trial.373 All states should
give serious consideration to the procedure. However, as currently structured,
peremptory challenge procedures do not go far enough.
For one thing, peremptory challenges are allowed only after a judge has been
assigned to the case. Because of this fact, the judge will know that she has been
challenged as biased, and also will know the identity of the lawyer making the charge.
Indeed, the peremptory challenge must be directed to the very judge whose integrity is
being questioned. This process places the trial judge in the unsatisfactory position of
being confronted with a serious accusation going to her fitness to serve without the least
opportunity to defend herself. While it may be argued that the judge does not need to
defend herself since the challenge must be granted as a matter of right, it would be
natural for a judge to feel insulted and frustrated at being required to grant relief to a
party who has made what the judge considers to be an unwarranted slight to her integrity.
Related to this concern is the fact that the judge will know the identity of the challenger.
Some states provide thata party exercising the right to a peremptory challenge cannot be
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punished by contempt for doing so, or that if a judge’s ruling is reversed on appeal, the
appellant has the right to challenge the trial judge on remand.374 But these rules do not
address the problem of retribution against attorneys. While litigants may never appear in
the judge’s courtroom again, the lawyer probably will, and judges have long memories.
The judge might bide her time and then take out her frustration on an attorney in another
case. And it is, of course, exactly the bad judges who are most likely to exact this kind of
payback. Attorneys, knowing this risk, may be less inclined to exercise their client’s
peremptory challenge in order to stay on good terms with the judge.
Peremptory challenges of judges create particular difficulties in states that require
the attorney to make a sworn allegation that the judge cannot provide a fair trial. This
requirement exacerbates the problem of insult to the judge and potential retribution
against the attorney. Beyond this, the obligation to make an allegation under oath creates
tensions with the attorney’s role as advocate for the client. Suppose that a plaintiff’s
attorney considers the judge to be incompetent but not unfair. In light of the complexity
of the issues, the attorney believes that the judge is unlikely to understand the theory of
the case. The client would be much better off with a different judge. Or suppose the
attorney believes that the judge has strong ideological views unfavorable to the client’s
case, such that the judge is likely, given a matter of first impression, to rule for the
adversary. On the other hand, the attorney also believes that the judge is willing to apply
the law to the facts once the law has been decided. Can the attorney make the required
attestation in these cases? Presumably not because the attorney does not have adequate
grounds to believe the judge is incapable of providing a fair trial. But the attorney’s duty
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of vigorous advocacy on behalf of the client, coupled with the fact that the veracity of the
attorney’s affidavit cannot be questioned, might encourage the attorney to do so.
Finally, data on peremptory challenges of judges have not been used to aid in
retention, supervision or re-election. The frequency of peremptory challenges would
appear to provide useful information about a judge’s reputation for fair-mindedness and
integrity. However, these statistics do not appear to be maintained or distributed.
III. The Panel Exclusion Approach
Having surveyed the landscape of existing approaches to the bad judges problem,
we can now assess the panel exclusion idea. This idea has two parts. First, the court
administrator would select at random panels of three or five trial judges for any given
case. The names of these judges would be given to the parties but the judges themselves
would be shielded from knowledge that they are on any particular panel. Each party
would then have the unqualified right at the outset of a case to exclude one judge (in the
case of a three judge panel) or two judges (in the case of a five judge panel). Exercises of
this exclusion right would be kept confidential and not shared either with the opposing
party or with the judges on the panels. After the parties have exercised their exclusion
rights (or refrained from exercising them), the court administrator would select a trial
judge from those remaining on the panel. As the idea is constructed, there would never
be fewer than one judge remaining on the panel even if all exclusion rights were
exercised. The trial judge who is selected would then handle the litigation in the ordinary
course.375
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This idea is similar to procedures common used to select labor arbitrators. See, e.g., American
Arbitration Association, Labor Arbitration Rule 12, available at
http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=15747&JSPsrc=upload\LIVESITE\Rules_Procedures\National_I
nternational\..\..\focusArea\labor\laborarbrules.html#12 (providing that if the parties have not designated a

65

The panel exclusion idea would need to be implemented in such a way as to
account for several of the issues that have arisen in connection with peremptory
challenges of judges. For example, it would be necessary for exclusion rights to be
exercised by a specified time early in the proceeding. Unlike the peremptory challenge
model, the early exercise of exclusion rights would tend to be self-regulating in the panel
exclusion idea since the case cannot progress unless a judge has been assigned, and the
judge would not be assigned until the parties had exercised their exclusions. The system
would also have to account for issues of multiple parties. When only a plaintiff and a
defendant are involved, its administration would be straightforward, but when third party
defendants, intervening plaintiffs, or additional defendants with conflicting interests are
joined, the matter becomes more complicated. However, these issues have been handled
satisfactorily in states with peremptory judicial challenges, and there is no reason they
could not also be dealt with efficiently under the panel exclusion idea.
The second part of the panel exclusion idea is that the court administrator would
compile information about exclusion rates and make this information public in
connection with selection, retention, or removal. The idea here is that the decision to
exclude a judge will be made (in the usual case) by attorneys who have good information
about the quality of the judges under consideration. Because attorneys are repeat players
in jurisdictions in which they practice, they will often have personal experience with the
judges selected for the panel, and thus have a good basis on which to make the exclusion
method for selecting arbitrators, the arbitration association provides a list of potential arbitrators to the
parties, who thereafter have the right to strike names of persons they do not want to hear the case); Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service Rule 1404.12(c)(1), available at
http://www.fmcs.gov/internet/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=197&itemID=16959 (providing that where
collective bargaining agreement is silent on method of selecting arbitrators, arbitrator may be selected from
panel by each party striking a name until one remains).
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decision. Even if an attorney has slight or no personal experience with a judge, she will
often have partners or associates who have experience with the judge. And attorneys
have opportunities to obtain information about judges through informal contacts with
other attorneys. Moreover, the panel exclusion idea, if implemented, would provide
additional incentives for attorneys to become informed about judges because they will
know that they are likely to be faced with exclusion decisions in the future. Because the
exclusion decision is likely to be made by a well-informed party, it provides potentially
reliable information about the quality of the judges under consideration. The quality of
the information would be further enhanced by the compilation of numerous exclusion
decisions into an overall statistic thatwould tend to correct for mistakes in individual
cases.
Exclusion rates could be used in a number of different ways. For example, if
judges are slated for retention elections under a merit selection process, the exclusion
rates of the candidates could be distributed to the public along with some key for
evaluating a candidate’s performance relative to her colleagues. The same could be done
if a judge runs for re-election. One might imagine an even more potent use of these
statistics: a jurisdiction could provide that a judge would be disqualified from running for
re-election or retention if her exclusion rates exceeded some high threshold. Data on
exclusion rates could be useful even if a judge does not stand for election. High rates of
exclusion provide feedback to a judge, or to persons charged with supervising the judge,
that there is something amiss in her conduct. Even in the federal system with life tenure
for judges, exclusion rates could be helpful at identifying problems and providing judges
with an incentive to correct their deficiencies. These data could also be useful in the case

67

of promotions in the federal system: if a district court judge is a candidate for nomination
to an appellate position, his or her record of exclusion would presumably be something
that the president and the senate would take into account.
The panel exclusion idea would address most of the problems with bad judges
identified earlier in this paper. Judges who are corrupt, venal, biased, incompetent,
neglectful, whimsical, partisan, arbitrary, abusive, or conflicted would face exclusion
under this reform. The panel exclusion concept would cover a wider range of misconduct
than even the peremptory challenge procedure, which is (in theory) limited to cases in
which the judge’s bias renders her unlikely to provide a fair and impartial forum.376
Indeed, the idea would cover judicial qualities which do not fall into any category of
misconduct. Parties would have the opportunity to select for desirable qualities such as
excellence in legal analysis or superior judicial temperament.
The panel exclusion idea offers other benefits. Because judges wouldnot be
aware that they are assigned to panels and because exclusions would be implemented by
court administrators, judges would not face the unsatisfactory necessity, which they
experience in peremptory challenge jurisdictions, of having to approve a motion that is
based on an insult to their very fitness for office. For the same reason, lawyers and
litigants who exercise their exclusion rights have no reason to fear retribution from the
judge. Judges would not know the identities of people who excluded them. Even if a
judge found out, she would not have a good reason to take offense. Because exclusion
decisions could be made for any reason or no reason at all, there would be no insult to the
judge from the fact of being excluded. Indeed, parties would often exercise their

68

exclusion rights for the same reason that parties exercise peremptory challenges to jurors
in criminal trials: if there is even a slight reason to prefer one judge over another, the
party would have an incentive to exclude the less preferred judge. Being excluded in a
given case would not necessarily represent a negative assessment about the judge’s
fitness for office.
The panel exclusion idea would appear to represent a constructive approach to the
tension between accountability, independence and quality in the selection and supervision
of American judges. Decisions by private litigants to exclude judges from panels do not
threaten the autonomy or integrity of the judicial branch. At the same time, the panel
selection idea creates significant opportunities for holding judges accountable to the very
parties – litigants and lawyers – who have the most at stake. Judges who do not act in
ways that are acceptable to these constituents will be excluded. The accountability
achieved by the panel exclusion idea would be particularly valuable in jurisdictions with
appointed judges, since it would permit litigants to vote with their feet. The idea also
mitigates the potential adverse effects of achieving accountability through electoral
selection of judges. The “majoritarian difficulty”377 of elected judges is controlled, to
some extent, if litigants have the right to exclude judges whose integrity may be
compromised by political obligations.
The panel selection idea would not increase public suspicion of judges or
undermine the rule of law. It is true that exclusion rates would be made public, or at least
made available to persons with authority for selecting candidates for retention or re376

The panel exclusion process would not, however, deal with all cases of bad judges: personal
misconduct outside the bench, for example, might not be regulated even when the judge’s peccadilloes
reflect adversely on her fitness for office.
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election. The public would have access to information that judges were excluded from
sitting on cases. This information, however, would not necessarily evoke concern. If the
public understood that exclusions could be made for any reason or no reason at all, they
would see that even a relatively high exclusion rate would not impeach the judiciary’s
competence or integrity. At the same time, public trust in the judiciary and the rule of
law would likely be increased to the extent that people perceived that they have the
power to reject trial judges whose integrity or impartiality they distrust. Moreover, if the
panel exclusion idea is effective, the result would be to weed out bad judges, eventually
enhancing judicialquality and, concomitantly , increasing public respect for the judiciary
and the rule of law.
The panel exclusion idea would take some of the pressure off other methods for
controlling bad judges. For example, if a party distrusts the fairness of a trial judge, she
could simply exclude the judge from the panel. It would not be necessary for the party
move to recuse the judge, which as already noted is both risky for the moving party and
potentially damaging to the reputation of the judiciary.378 Similarly, panel exclusions
would take some of the pressure off judicial disciplinary commissions: many potential
instances of judicial misconduct could be averted by exclusion, and the process of
exclusion itself together with publication of exclusion rates could deter misconduct which
would otherwise fall within the responsibility of these commissions.
The panel exclusion idea would appear relatively easy to implement. It would be
necessary for the court administrator to come up with the requisite number of judges for
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the panels – a requirement that might pose problems in states with rural populations.
Judges might be required to hear cases as visitors in other courtrooms. The experience of
California and other states using peremptory challenges of judges, however, indicates that
this staffing problem would not be overwhelming. In other respects the panel exclusion
idea appears more efficient than many other approaches for controlling bad judges.
Parties would not be required to seek out inconvenient forums. Protracted and costly
hearings would not be needed to establish whether or not the judge was biased or
otherwise engaged in misconduct. The panel exclusion idea even offers cost advantages
as compared with peremptory challenges of judges, which is in itself an inexpensive
procedure: because judges would be excluded at the very outset, judges would not have
the opportunity to issue even preliminary rulings before being excluded (other than on
emergency motions such as temporary restraining orders). The chief judge or court
administrator would not have to make seriatim appointments, and there would be no
grounds for objection to exclusion on the ground that it was made in bad faith or for
purposes of delay.
In objection to the panel exclusion idea, it could be argued that challenges to
judges should only be used to protect against the danger of biased tribunals, and should
not be employed as a means “to obtain strategic advantage by forum shopping for an
ideal judge.”379 But the idea would not involve “judge-shopping.” It may be
inappropriate for parties to take strategic advantage of a procedure devised for other
reasons in order to obtain a benefit unanticipated by the framers of the procedure in
question. This is not the panel exclusion idea, which is specifically designed to allow
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parties to exercise exclusion rights for any reason or no reason at all. Excluding judges
under this process is no more “judge shopping” than exercising peremptory challenges of
jurors is “jury shopping.” It is true, of course, that the essence of the idea is to allow
parties some say in the selection of the judges who will hear their cases; but to denigrate
this as “judge shopping” is to substitute invective for analysis.
Another objection to the panel exclusion idea is that its effect would be to create a
regression of judges towards a neutral but unimaginative mean. Crusading or creative
judges might not be selected. It might be argued that innovative or opinionated judges
add a desirable leaven to the flatbread of ordinary law, or that even if their creativity is
problematic, their brillianceand energy more than compensate for their shortcomings.
However, the panel exclusion idea would not rule out brilliant or imaginative jurists.
Complex cases often demand untried approaches; and it is frequently in the interests of
all parties that the judge keep an open mind as to how a case might be litigated or a
remedy devised. As to a crusading interest in a particular matter, the answer is that such
judges are not good judges if they allow personal views to infect decisions, even if we
agree with their philosophy on the merits. At least at the trial level, the judge ought to
oversee a process in which the facts are found in an impartial and fair manner and the law
is applied as set forth by the legislature or interpreted by the courts. The panel exclusion
idea would tend to select for this kind of judge.
Conclusion
This paper has explored the problem of bad judges in America’s courts. The
article identified types of judicial misconduct and provided examples of each. It
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examined existing approaches to the issue, each of which in different ways seeks to
balance the values of independence, accountability and quality.
The paper then proposed a new approach. Under the panel exclusion idea, the
court administrator would randomly select a panel of judges and present the names to the
litigants. The litigants would be allowed to exclude judges in such a way that at least one
judge would be left at the end of the process. Parties would not be required to provide
any reason for striking a potential judge, and judges would not know they have been
excluded. Exclusion rates would be complied and used in the process of retention, reelection and supervision. The article argued that the panel exclusion idea has merit when
combined with existing approaches and that it offers advantages over currently available
options.
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